Military Review English Edition March-April 2015 | Page 109

ANBAR AWAKENING

T

he takeover of large swaths of Iraq by the socalled Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in
2014 may invite new interest in the possible
relevance of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)-era
phenomenon known as the Anbar Awakening. In a
remarkable turnaround—in the general time frame between spring 2005 and spring 2007—local Iraqi tribal
forces converted from being enemies of U.S. forces to
U.S. allies in the fight against al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI)
and its domination of Anbar Province where it had
become most entrenched. Organized tribal resistance
to AQI, which had already begun in pockets of Anbar
prior to obtaining U.S. support, was a process that
emerged from a confluence of factors within a specific set of unique circumstances. Tribal forces did the
majority of the fighting throughout the province and
brought a critical mass of the Anbar population into
Iraqi government agencies (e.g., Ministry of Defense
units and police precincts), and a political party called
Sahawa—at least for a period.1
Even before 2014, the Anbar Awakening had
engendered enduring interest by Western military
and intelligence personnel as well as policy discourse
over the outcome of OIF. For serious students of
the movement who survey the literature produced
on the subject, it becomes quickly apparent that one
must appreciate the unique conditions that prompted these local figures and their constituents to reject
AQI in the particular place, time, and manner in
which they did, and that such conditions were requisite for the subsequent relationship they developed
with U.S. forces.
Irrespective, debate continues over exactly what
happened as the Awakening unfolded. Some authors
have sought to assign ultimate credit for the success
of the Awakening to a particular service, unit, or
person. Others have attributed success to a darker
side—a U.S. alliance with unsavory figures, some who
had been insurgents fighting coalition forces until
expediency enticed them to work with U.S. armed
forces. Some accounts have depicted the Awakening
as a failed process aimed at national reconciliation,
while alternate interpretations have characterized it
oppositely as primarily a Sunni challenge to the Shiadominated Iraqi central government. While opinions
differ, the most significant discussion of the debate
concerns the extent to which the Awakening can be
MILITARY REVIEW  March-April 2015

a template for replicating the establishment of local
defense forces to counter insurgencies.2
The problem with using the Awakening as a template for developing counterinsurgency programs elsewhere is that studies of the mechanics of providing support and training often isolate the Anbar Awakening
from its historical and cultural contexts that made
tribal forces receptive to U.S. support. This begs the
question, “Can we apply similar principles again in other circumstances?” I assert that the answer is yes—as
long as we are realistic about what the Awakening was
and was not, and as long as we account for differences
in culture and situational context in such efforts.

Observations on the Anbar
Awakening
The synthesis of observations provided in this article are intended to build a greater appreciation for the
Anbar Awakening’s place in history and to sharpen the
way we think about the extent and limits of its potential applicability to other situations.
In the Anbar Awakening (Sahawa), the United
States did not create something—it co-opted an
indigenous trend. For example, the United States did
not create the anti-AQI force that first emerged in
western Anbar in 2005. Rather, the U.S. military and
the Iraqi Ministry of Defense opportunistically backed
an Albu Mahal–led tribal force, which had lost its
control over an important town and trading route and
had taken the lead on its own to promote general tribal
rebellion against AQI. The United States essentially
deputized the resisting tribes as an ad hoc military
unit and worked with it to fight AQI and reclaim lost
land from AQI-affiliated rival tribes.3 Observing the
interim benefits associated with cooperating with the
U.S.-led coalition, other tribes followed suit.4 Likewise,
in Ramadi in September 2006 when the United States
blessed Sahawa, it was not a question of whether we
wanted Sahawa to exist but was rather a bid to influence an extant force to keep its efforts in line with U.S.
goals in Iraq. Prior to that September, many of Sahawa’s
constituent parts had been fighting AQI in the form of
organized militias for months—some longer—and were
determined to proceed with or without U.S. support.
Even though a movement is indigenous, the
United States can help shape it. The Awakening tribes
showed signs that, had they been left to their own
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