Military Review English Edition March-April 2014 | Page 83
BOOK REVIEWS
F E AT U R E D R E V I E W
ISLANDS OF DESTINY:
The Solomons Campaign and
the Eclipse of the Rising Sun
John Prados, NAL Caliber, 2012
388 pages, $26.95
D
R. JOHN PRADOS
challenges conventional
wisdom in an engrossing
new work on the Solomons
Campaign in World War II’s
Pacific Theater. Relying on
intelligence sources as well as
Japanese accounts, the author
argues that the Solomons
Campaign, and not the Battle
of Midway as many historians suggest, represents
the true decisive point that accorded the Allies an
unmistakable advantage over their Japanese adversaries in terms of air and maritime superiority. This
precipitated eventual Allied victory in the Pacific.
While many accounts of the Solomons Campaign
focus on the ground war and the desperate, compelling battles that ensued for control of islands such
as Guadalcanal and their critical airfields, Prados
concentrates on the vicious struggle for air and maritime superiority that was a corollary to permanent
success on the ground. Here, the Imperial Japanese
Navy was still a juggernaut, “down but not out” after
its spectacular loss of four carriers during the battle
of Midway in June 1942.
The author shows that the Imperial Japanese
Navy was more than a match for Allied naval forces,
particularly early in the campaign and especially at
night. The U.S. Navy suffered some of the worst
defeats in its history during the Solomons Campaign;
at the battle of Savo Island, for example, the Allies
lost four heavy cruisers in a single, brief engagement.
At one point during the campaign, the situation in
the Pacific became so dire that the Navy was down
to a single carrier in the entire theater—the USS
Enterprise—and had to request the loan of the HMS
Victorious from the British.
MILITARY REVIEW
March-April 2014
What turned the tide in favor of the Allies during
the Solomons? Intelligence was foremost, according
to Prados. The author successfully demonstrates that
multiple sources—or pillars, as he refers to them—
contributed to eventual Allied success. These included
not only the efforts of the well-known cryptanalysts,
or codebreakers, but also those of the invaluable
coast watchers, radio traffic analysts, scouts, and
indigenous persons who provided the Allies with the
edge on enemy movements and intentions.
However, as historian Sir John Keegan has shown,
intelligence alone doesn’t guarantee victory—tactical
execution still counts. The Allies were better able to
incorporate the pillars of intelligence to decisive advantage. This explanation is one of Prados’s strengths, as he
gives near-equal coverage to the Japanese viewpoint,
incorporating Japanese accounts, combat diaries, and
wartime message traffic. It is remarkable how similar
both sides were in terms of the primacy of leadership
personalities, interservice rivalries, and management
of the war with shoestring resources.
Another of the author’s obvious strengths is his
seamless integration of multiple events across all
levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical.
Readers will come away with a broad, holistic understanding of the Solomons Campaign, the strengths
and weaknesses of the protagonists, and the role
of intelligence as a precursor but not a guarantor of
victory. Prados succeeds in making his case in this
thought-provoking and highly readable effort.
Mark Montesclaros,
Fort Gordon, Georgia
THE REVENGE OF GEOGRAPHY:
What the Map Tells Us About Coming
Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate
Robert D. Kaplan, Random House,
New York, 2012, $27.95, 428 pages
R
OBERT KAPLAN’S THE Revenge of Geography is a worthy addition to his body of
81