Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 98

I

n 2015, I had the opportunity to host a senior
Chinese officer during his visit to the United
States. During our time together, he continually
expressed that the United States should have respect for
China, and that it should not pursue a policy of containment. No matter the topic of discussion, the official
always circled back to this theme. It seemed to me that
this perception of persecution bordered on paranoia.
Assuming the Chinese officer’s statements represented the views of his country’s leaders, I was
reminded of the historical situation with Imperial
Germany before World War I. An unreasonable fear
of encirclement influenced Germany’s political and
military class, a mentality that contributed to the
start of World War I. I wondered if modern Chinese
leaders, like German leaders of the past, were beginning to believe other countries in their region were
attempting to encircle them. If so, historical precedent
suggests that such paranoia on the part of China could
have grave consequences, particularly if China overreacted to perceived threats to its sovereignty.
To avoid such misunderstanding and the consequences that might follow, the United States and its
Asia-Pacific partners must work to debunk the notion—
where it exists among Chinese leaders—that the United
States and its partners are attempting to contain China.
The United States can accomplish this with a carefully
implemented strategy of balance.

Germany Before 1914
In 1871, a united Germany emerged on the world
stage as a great power following the spectacular defeat
of France in the Franco-Prussian War.1 Before 1871, the
Germanic peoples were divided among dozens of minor
kingdoms, duchies, principalities, and free cities, as well
as the two major German states, Austria and Prussia—
which were in competition for leadership of this widesp read hodgepodge of political entities. In this contest,
Prussia had steadily risen in power over the course
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, gaining
great influence among these disparate and mostly poor
German states, while Austria’s influence had slowly declined. Nonetheless, these powerful German states were
competing to unite the weaker ethnic German kingdoms
under a single banner of German-speaking leadership.2
The competition came to a head in 1866
when Austria and Prussia fought a short war for
96

hegemony over the lesser German states. Prussia
shocked Austria with a rapid and decisive victory
at Königgrätz on 3 July 1866. The Austrian Empire
assumed a subordinate position to Prussia thereafter.3 Prussia then established a loose confederation of
German states that stopped short of full political unification. However, enough control of foreign policy
and military affairs was ceded to Prussia that it could
dictate actions to its neighbors.4
In 1870, long-running friction between the French
and Prussians spilled over into war. Prussian Chancellor
Otto von Bismarck conjured up a crisis that would
require Prussia to act to save its honor. With commitments of forces from the confederation and its
own large army, Prussia fielded a combined army that
overwhelmed France. At the conclusion of hostilities
in 1871, Bismarck took the opportunity to proclaim
a united German Empire under the leadership of the
Prussian king, now emperor, Wilhelm I. In an 1871
ceremony at Versailles’ Hall of Mirrors in Paris, the new
state asserted its dominance. Subsequently, the new
balance among the great powers in Europe tilted heavily
toward imperial Germany.5 In just a few years, a new
nation forged from a patchwork of disunited, weak kingdoms and duchies had become the strongest power on
the European continent. As such, Germany commanded respect, and fostered fear, among its neighbors.
France, Britain, and Russia, perceiving a mutual
threat from the new German Empire, formed what
became known as the Triple Entente in 1907 to counter
Germany’s rapid rise. They considered their alliance
an insurance policy against future German expansion,
through commitments to support one another with
military forces in the event of a conflict.
German leaders, on the other hand, naturally
viewed this alliance as an attempt to stunt Germany’s
rise. As a result, German leaders—most notably Kaiser
Wilhelm II, who succeeded Wilhelm I in 1888—came
to believe their neighbors were attempting to encircle
Germany. In Wilhelm’s case, some historians believe his
mental state bordered on paranoia. In his engagements
with other European leaders, Wilhelm and his ministers routinely stated that Germany required “a place
in the sun” and adequate living space.6 His thought
processes are considered a major reason for the outbreak of World War I, in which Germany attacked first
to prevent encirclement.
July-August 2016  MILITARY REVIEW