Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 86

costs that Germany had
borne at Verdun, and
Gens. Hindenberg and
Ludendorff took over the
German war effort.

The Power of
Theory
The framework for
analyzing theories of
warfare presented at the
beginning of this essay is
a powerful lens for understanding why militaries do what they do. The
theory of warfare held by
the German army prior
to 1914 was rooted in its
1870 victory and dictated
that the goal of a military
is the destruction of the
enemy in a single battle,
characterized by decisive
(Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)
maneuver, after which
Exhausted French troops in the central corridor of Fort Vaux, February 1916. In June 1916, Fort Vaux
the winner dictates
became the second fort to fall in the Battle of Verdun. At that time, it was virtually undefended due to
terms to the loser. In the
the scarcity of resources.
context of Germany’s
strategic givens, this resulted in the Schlieffen Plan
stalled in unfavorable terrain, commanders continued
and the attempt to envelop the entire French Army.
to press forward with the terrain-oriented purpose of
By 1916, Falkenhayn replaced this theory with the
seizing Verdun as opposed to Falkenhayn’s force-oriidea that military forces destroy enemy formations
ented objective of obtaining desirable loss-exchange
in a series of surprise attacks, limited breakthroughs,
ratios. Finally, because the theory posited an unoband robust defenses. Once the enemy is incapable of
servable link between residual military capability and
achieving its aims militarily, space opens for a diplopolitical capitulation, the German staff relied on meamatic settlement. This approach succeeded in the east
surements of French casualties to estimate the remainduring 1915, and it became the basis for the German
ing French national will. Both their casualty estimates
attack on Verdun in the west.
and their beliefs about French willpower were in error,
In addition to explaining military behavior, underand in fact, it was not until the massive casualities
standing a military’s theory of warfare also enables
suffered in the aftermath of the 1917 French offensive
one to see where and how it might fail. At Verdun, the
that French units began to mutiny.
inability of the artillery to advance quickly over heavily shelled terrain meant the attack stalled, resulting
America’s Theory of Warfare
in the Germans losing the overwhelming firepower
German theories of warfare are useful in understandadvantage the theory demanded. Further, the need
ing the nature of the German army, its employment in
for secrecy to gain the advantages of surprise preWorld War I, and, importantly, the deficiencies in the
vented clear communication of commander’s intent
German theory of warfare that led to poor strategic defrom Falkenhayn to his subordinates. Once the attack
cision making and a costly defeat at Verdun. Wit h those
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July-August 2016  MILITARY REVIEW