Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 61

NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS

determine the international coordination procedures
but it is becoming increasingly likely that NATO SOF
for such actions at the interagency and interminiscould support such a mission.
terial levels. It was
NATO SOF docimperative to establish
trine does state that
collective security
NATO “SOF should
arrangements for a CT
“SOF should be utilized when
be utilized when there
response in advance
is high risk, a need for
there is high risk, a need
of an Article 5 request
special capabilities, or
due to the multinarequirements to confor special capabilities, or
tional nature of modduct covert or clanern terrorism threats
destine operations.”28
requirements to conduct covert
and the increasingly
Take the case of the
or
clandestine
operations.”
complex nature of the
2004 Madrid train
European security
bombing, in which
(NATO
SOF
doctrine)
environment. This
191 were killed and
started in a general
1,800 were woundsense with the 2006
ed.29 The investigation
Riga Summit’s decision to launch a SOF transformaled Spanish authorities to an apartment building in the
tion initiative intended to increase interoperability and
Leganes neighborhood of Madrid. On 3 April 2004,
dialogue between NATO SOF units.22
the Spanish Grupo Especial de Operaciones attempted a
As previously noted, NATO SOF doctrine does
raid on the terrorist suspect’s apartment building. Four
not hold CT as one of its three principal missions. The
terror suspects committed suicide by detonating a large
first NATO SOF doctrine publication, Allied Joint
explosive device in the building, killing one police offiPublication (AJP)-3.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special
cer and wounding eleven others.30 Spanish authorities
Operations, identifies the three principal NATO SOF
were not prepared for, or capable of conducting, a raid
missions as military assistance, special reconnaisagainst an asymmetric threat on their own soil.
23
sance, and direct action. Surprisingly, AJP-3.5 only
includes one paragraph dedicated to CT.24 Ostensibly,
Conclusion
NATO SOF CT doctrine amounts to four sentencNATO member states need one central institution for
es taken directly from NATO’s Policy Guidelines on
support when faced with an overwhelming terror crisis,
Counter-Terrorism.25 In comparison, AJP-3.5’s “Record
and NATO SOF should be that institution. And, NATO
of Specific Reservations,” which essentially notes
SOF must be adequately resourced so their CT capabildisagreements on the use of joint-doctrine terms by
ities meet partner-nation requirements. In the case of
partner nations, is a full page and a half.26 AJP-3.5 does the Madrid bombers, requirements may have included
acknowledge that special operations can take place
advanced explosive ordnance disposal personnel and
as “part of Article 5 collective defense or non-Article
equipment, a determination of which units were mis5 crisis response operations to fulfill NATO’s three
sion-ready, and transportation to Madrid.
essential core tasks (collective defense, crisis manAnother challenge that will have to be addressed is the
agement, and cooperative security),” but it does not
absence of NATO SOF CT minimum capability requiredefine any CT focus.27 It is self-evident that any of the
ments. AJP-3.5 provides the minimum capability requirethree NATO SOF principal missions could support
ments for a number of NATO SOF elements, to include
or include a CT mission, but that is not sufficient for
land and maritime units.31 These minimum capability
the current (and increasing) threat. In the modern
requirements include specialty skills such as “directing
threat environment, CT needs to be a priority of
terminal guidance control of precision guided munitions”
NATO SOF. It is unlikely the NATO leadership had
for a land element and “opposed boarding operations” for
a direct-action raid against an IS cell in a suburb of a
a maritime element.32 However, not one of the deployEuropean capital in mind when AJP-3.5 was drafted,
able NATO SOF structures comes with defined CT
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