Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 50

maintained, if not by local forces then by competent
and numerically adequate outsiders.
In El Salvador, an admixture of desperation, opportunism, and revanchism fueled a postconflict crime
wave that brought death tolls greater than the average war year and contributed to long-term social and
economic dislocation.26 Amid the enthusiasm for peace,
a disarmament and demobilization program overseen
by the United Nations (UN) dismantled the coercive

the Congo, and more recently, in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Libya. Indeed, the transmutation of forms and types
of violence following the formal conclusion of war is
a typical peacebuilding challenge. This risk is particularly high in Colombia. Homicide rates have fallen
to record lows, and incidents between FARC and the
government have virtually ceased since July 2015. Yet
coca plantations are growing, reflecting a surging illicit
economy underpinned by violence. As Adam Isacson
and Gimena SánchezGarzoli note, “The U.S.
government measured
159,000 hectares (613
square miles) of territory
planted with coca bushes
in 2015, the third-highest annual amount
ever.”28 New paramilitary groups are also
increasing their activity,
capitalizing on the gaps
left by FARC and the
government. Isacson and
Sánchez-Garzoli note a
“terrifying spike” in the
month of March against
human rights defenders,
most of them in rural
zones and urban areas
where the state’s presence is weak.29
Meanwhile, Ejército
(Photo by Tom Marks)
de Liberación Nacional
A Colombian military urban patrol member interacts with the populace in Pereira, Department of
Risaralda, Colombia, September 2003.
(ELN), a smaller but
nonetheless significant
capacity of the state and rebel forces, resulting in a
Colombian guerrilla group, has, despite engaging in
power vacuum at an acutely fragile moment, particupeace talks with the government, also carried out more
larly as the creation of new forces, predictably, became
attacks of late and “appears to be increasing its presence
27
a drawn-out and complex affair. Because the UN
in zones of FARC influence.”30 FARC points to these
operation was also not mandated, tasked, or structured developments when it insists on retaining its weapons
to provide public security, there were in effect no forces during and after the peace agreement, so as to ensure
present to check the mounting crime wave. While the
its protection, but for the same reason it also expects
criminality did not trigger renewed war, its effects—vithe military to transition from counterinsurgency to
olence, gangs, and government illegitimacy—haunt El
external threats—to adopt the role it would play in a
Salvador, and the region, to this day.
safe and secure democracy. The convergence of risk facA lack of postconflict security was seen also in
tors and security sector reform may produce a perfect
Guatemala and Panama, the Democratic Republic of
storm of insecurity and violence, all in a time of peace.
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July-August 2016  MILITARY REVIEW