Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 48

abuses in the recent past, this rhetoric appears far more unfavorable rating since 1998 has seldom slipped below
instrumental than earnest, producing strategic advan90 percent and has often been higher.22 Whereas by
tage rather than needed protection.
1989 in El Salvador, 83 percent of the Salvadoran popIndeed, when evidence emerged of FARC orgaulation wanted a negotiated settlement, in Colombia,
nizing armed political rallies in the peace zones and
only 57 percent of the country woul d vote “yes” in a
the government sought to prohibit such activity,
hypothetical plebiscite on the FARC peace accord; 33
FARC objected that the government was changing
percent are opposed.23
the terms of the agreement and was “basically seeking
Given FARC’s lack of support and legitimacy, cou19
a surrender.” Again the government had to retreat.
pled with its much diminished military position, neSurrender may indeed have been the preferred conclugotiations as equals was never the optimal framework
sion of the Democratic Security Policy, given FARC’s
for peace making in Colombia. This forces the question
military-weakened position at the time and its lack
of what a military and political defeat of FARC would
of resonance in Colombian society, and yet—much
have required.
as the United States
and its NATO allies
experienced in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and
Libya—translating
military gains into political victories proved
far too challenging. In
this, lack of will and
misguided assessment
by the Santos government certainly played
a key role.
This point raises
another difference
between El Salvador
and Colombia. In
El Salvador, FMLN
emerged as the main
opposition party in
(Photo by Rodrigo Abd, Associated Press)
the very first elections Members of the 36th Front of the FARC trek to a new camp in Department of Antioquia, in the northwest
that followed the war- Andes of Colombia, 6 January 2016. Big guerrilla camps are a thing of the past; the rebels now move
in smaller groups. The 36th Front is comprised of twenty-two rank and file fighters, four commanders,
to-peace transition,
and two dogs. Constant military, social, and political pressure by the Colombian government on FARC
reflecting its support
for more than a decade, together with loss of covert support from Venezuela, has greatly reduced the
geographic scope of FARC influence.
across Salvadoran
society. As a former
FMLN commander explained, even though its party
Sri Lanka again provides precedents, given its total
came in a distant second, it felt empowered by the sup- military and political defeat of both the LTTE and of
port and able from this new position to effect political
Janathā Vimukthi Peramuna ( JVP), a Maoist insur20
change, obviating further conflict.
gent group. First, in its design and execution, a military
In contrast, FARC has very little public support.
victory must avoid offering the defeated threat group
In an August 2015 poll, more than 90 percent of
precisely the type of support (particularly international
respondents indicated FARC leadership should go
support) that it so sorely lacked beforehand and that
21
to jail. Mass rallies have denounced FARC, and its
may help it offset its military losses. In the case of the
46

July-August 2016  MILITARY REVIEW