Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 44

Lanka, Nepal, and El Salvador) raises difficult questions
regarding Colombia’s way ahead.

Peace as a Continuation of War
All capable insurgent groups understand that
the use of force—or violence—is only strategically
relevant in so far as it creates political space and influence. These goals can equally be obtained through
other ways, such as the exploitation of negotiation to
achieve protection, immunity, or political concessions
incommensurate with a group’s military achievements
and social standing.
The approach can be seen most forcefully in the
conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government, which involved four periods of negotiation, all mediated by foreign powers, and all deeply problematic in implementation and intent, certainly on the part of LTTE. During
the final truce, initiated by LTTE in February 2002, it
used the restrictions on Sri Lankan security forces to
move aggressively into Tamil areas from which it had
previously been denied.3 In October 2003, LTTE issued
a proposal, Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA),
which would have pushed beyond de facto realities to
make it the de jure power in the Northern and Eastern
Provinces.4 Following the devastating 26 December
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the ISGA proposal took
on all the trappings of statehood, as the LTTE sought
to channel the international aid pouring in to Sri
Lanka through its own counterstate bureaucracy.5
Throughout, psychological operations targeting the
state continued, all while LTTE used the cease-fire as
cover to eliminate those who stood in its way, including
the Sri Lankan foreign minister and literally hundreds
of Tamil politicians and activists.
The point is that LTTE remained committed to war,
whatever the verbiage connected with the peace process. In his annual 27 November 2005 speech, delivered
on LTTE Heroes Day, “President and Prime Minister
of Eelam” (as Tamil media billed him) Velupillai
Prabhakaran warned that LTTE intended to renew
hostilities if the government made no tangible moves
toward peace.6 At the same time, prominent LTTE
suicide attacks, including an attempted assassination of
the commander of the Sri Lankan Army Lt. Gen. Sarath
Fonseka, and the successful targeting of the army number three, pushed the situation beyond redemption. Still
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grasping for an ever-more unlikely diplomatic victory,
Norway—the lead facilitator of the attempted settlement—made last-gasp efforts at mediation that predictably faltered. As violence increased, suicide attacks
hit even targets in the deep south of Sri Lanka, and by
August 2006, the country was again at war.
Colombia should be familiar with the strategy
employed by LTTE. Peace negotiations have been attempted several times prior to the present round, most
recently during the Pastrana administration, but these
always came to naught. To break with “repression” and
pursue peace, Pastrana complemented negotiations
with excursion tours for FARC leaders to meet with
European officials, particularly those of social-democratic persuasion, so the FARC leaders would see and
hear for themselves how such regimes functioned in the
modern political world. It was hoped that such visits
would speak to FARC’s own revolutionary aspirations
and inspire peaceful mediation of grievances. FARC
nominally accepted the government’s gesture but
pushed it further—it demanded the establishment of a
zona de distensión (demilitarized zone, or zona). The government yielded to FARC control over an area the size
of Switzerland and a population of some one hundred
thousand. In reality, FARC’s intent was to buy time to
prepare for its “final offensive.” As amply documented
by Colombian intelligence, it utilized its trips abroad to
make new contacts and open new routes for its narcotics shipments. Its zona became an unassailable staging
ground for further criminal enterprise and attacks.7
After more than three years of negotiations,
Pastrana and his advisers were no closer to peace.
FARC leaders continually introduced new issues and
allegations that were disruptive and counterproductive
to actual progress. The point, of course, was to prolong
the process and allow the movement to reorganize and
strengthen its military capabilities, as well as to expand
its involvement in the drug cycle. In one of his last
official acts, Pastrana ordered the military to reoccupy
the zona. By this time, however, and in spite of ongoing
military operations, major FARC forces were deployed
even around Bogota, the capital, blockading the most
important national highways and stifling trade and
travel. Steep rises in crimes, such as kidnapping and
drug trafficking, led to increased fear and even panic,
as there was a sense that FARC was the most powerful
organization in Colombia.
July-August 2016  MILITARY REVIEW