Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 133

BOOK REVIEWS

noncombatants and (2) to ascertain their own lessons
and messages directly from those involved. Avenue of
Spies is a true and riveting account of courage, commitment, and resilience in the face of true evil.

Maj. Laura Freeland, U.S. Army,
Fort Lee, Virginia

AMERICA’S MODERN WARS
Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan
and Vietnam

Christopher A. Lawrence, Casemate Publishers,
Havertown, Pennsylvania, 2015, 376 pages

A

nalyzing the outcomes of historical
events can assist leaders in their future
decision-making processes. Christopher
Lawrence provides a well-researched and well-analyzed study of the nature of insurgencies and guerrilla warfare since World War II. He conducted his
analysis in conjunction with The Dupuy
Institute’s long-term insurgency research.
Their research provides a unique quantitative historical analysis of this subject
using a wide array of influencing factors
to anticipate the outcome of a particular
type of insurgency. However, Lawrence
does not dismiss the unpredictability of
the human element in his conclusions.
Over the past forty years, strategic
and tactical counterinsurgency thinking has had limited advancement. The
author looked at a number of variables
that affected the outcomes of insurgencies
as a means to advance knowledge in this
area. Specifically, the author uses data from numerous
cases since World War II to illustrate how selected
variables have affected the outcomes of insurgencies
and counterinsurgencies. He also examines conditions where there was no decisive winner. His analysis
includes comparing and contrasting specific variables
(e.g., terrain, location, sanctuary, and others) and, then,
considers thoughts from renowned insurgency theorists. Overwhelmingly, the data he analyzed proves
that force ratios and insurgent causes are the two most
important factors that influence insurgencies.
MILITARY REVIEW  July-August 2016

The author and the Dupuy Institute use selected
models to predict the outcomes of insurgencies. The
results of these models continually produce patterns
showing that the motivation of insurgents and high
force ratios are key factors that influence success in
either insurgencies or counterinsurgencies. Taking into
consideration these two key variables, along with the
results of his studies, Lawrence argues that the United
States has engaged in counterinsurgencies with half or
less of an optimum number of forces.
During the Gulf War in 1990–1991, the Dupuy
Institute used their combat model to provide multiple
casualty estimates to the U.S. House of Representatives
for an intervention into Kuwait. The accuracy of their
model’s prediction was noted by many authoritative
sources. Subsequently, the Department of Defense contra cts the institute to provide estimates for the recent
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. It bases its estimates
on data from previous insurgencies, and results are in
line with actual casualties. Using various factors, based
on historical data discussed throughout the book, the
author shows how best the United
States can project power and eliminate the previous pitfalls.
Lawrence is clear that the methodology in his research cannot predict
the outcome of a future insurgency.
However, his measures of research
have shown consistent validity and
reliability in their outcomes. The analysis of historical data demonstrates
that affected military interventions,
specifically insurgencies in this study,
can assist planners to anticipate
possible outcomes. Lawrence and the
institute explain and show how their
models closely estimated the actual outcomes of events
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, the analysis
using their models provides a logical estimate of what
it would have taken for the United States and allied
forces to be successful in Vietnam.
Lawrence’s book shows that reliable outcome estimates are determined through quantitative reasoning.
Being able to anticipate the outcomes of any military
operation, through reliable means, can greatly assist in
strategic and operational level leaders’ decision-making
processes. These results are what the book brings to
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