Military Review English Edition July-August 2016 | Page 119

SUSTAINABLE READINESS

approaches can assist in guiding commanders as
they plan, prepare, and execute these strategically
important operations across the globe. The following attempts to define the relationship between RAF
and the Army’s concept of sustainable readiness while
providing specific practices and observations from a
cavalry squadron that recently participated in an RAF
deployment as a possible way to approach achieving
balance in that relationship.

Sustainable Readiness Model

The Sustainable Readiness Model will empower commanders and is flexible enough to accommodate differing readiness levels given anticipated mission requirements.1
—Lt. Gen. James L. Huggins Jr.
The Sustainable Readiness Model is the successor
to the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model
that drove manning, equipping, and training cycles
from 2006 through 2014. ARFORGEN was a “structured progression of increased unit readiness over
time” that cycled battalions and brigades through three
“force pools.”2 This model assumed that formations
would be unavailable for contingencies immediately
following return to home station due to precipitous
drops in overall readiness stemming from personnel
turnover and a corresponding decline in training proficiency. Following this period (known as “reset”), commanders steadily rebuilt their equipment, manning,
and training readiness on a schedule synchronized
with the unit’s timeline for the next deployment.3
Due to the limited time available between deployments under ARFORGEN, training plans were
often dictated by higher headquarters, leaving fewer
opportunities for leaders below the battalion level to
conduct their own planning and assessments. Though
ARFORGEN provided much-needed predictability when yearly combat deployments to Iraq and
Afghanistan were the norm, it also limited the Army’s
flexibility to respond to unforeseen contingencies, as
large numbers of recently returned units were, in essence, out of the fight until they could work their way
back to the “available” force pool. At the lower levels,
the top-down approach to training and preparing for
deployment allowed many officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to grow accustomed to having
training plans provided by higher headquarters.
MILITARY REVIEW  July-August 2016

In contrast, the central idea behind sustainable
readiness is the reduction of the “peaks and valleys”
that characterized ARFORGEN.4 It eliminates the
planned period of unit nonavailability following deployments and requires that commanders maintain an
acceptable readiness level at all times. Exactly what level of readiness is acceptable varies based on the nature
of the unit’s anticipated deployment. As the Army’s
number of brigade combat teams reduces to approximately thirty by the end of fiscal year 2017, there is
also an increased urgency to avoid readiness “cliffs.”5
The Army must maintain immediate responsiveness
and deterrence along a broad spectrum of possible
contingencies. Just as ARFORGEN was needed to support the Global War on Terrorism, sustainable readiness is what the Army needs to support RAF.

Sustainable Readiness Tailored to
Regionally Aligned Forces
The purpose of RAF is to provide forces that are
“specifically trained” and “culturally attuned” to the
needs of geographic combatant commanders.6 For
brigades and below, this ideally means special training
in language, history, and cultural awareness in addition
to their core mission essential tasks. However, more
important with regard to sustainable readiness is that
a unit’s likely mission within the aligned region determines the minimum level of qualification and certification acceptable for commanders. For example, a brigade
combat team aligned with U.S. Central Command and
deployed to Kuwait as a theater reserve might need to
maintain live-fire qualifications at the battalion level
in order to accomplish its assigned missions. However,
another commander with a different alignment and
mission could determine that only certified platoons
are necessary. In either case, if the unit falls below that
point, higher headquarters must provide the necessary
training resources, personnel, or equipment to bring it
back above the acceptable level.
As noted, ARFORGEN largely consolidated the
management of readiness at the highest levels, but sustainable readiness returns this responsibility to battalion- and company-level commanders. Lieutenant colonels and captains, supported by engaged subordinate
leadership within platoons, must effectively project
shortfalls and then take proactive measures to smooth
over the “peaks and valleys” of readiness. But, since this
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