Military Review English Edition July-August 2015 | Page 106

(Photo by Azhar Shallal, AFP, Getty Images)

Iraqi tribal fighters, backing government forces, fire from behind a berm at Islamic State group positions in Abu Risha District on the northern
outskirts of the Iraqi Sunni Muslim city of Ramadi, 22 September 2014.

and his associates tried to delegitimize Iraqis’ strong tribal
loyalties, as they thought loyalty to one’s tribe conflicted
with submission to religious authority.11
Zarqawi and AQI felt they had license to condemn
and execute anyone they found disloyal to Islam, whether
this disloyalty came from participation in the new political process, contact with U.S. forces, or allowing tribal
bonds to outstrip one’s dedication to jihad. This extremism
conflicted with traditional Iraqi interpretations of Islam,
including even the understanding of many Iraqi Islamists,
who did not view political participation or tribal loyalties
as contrary to religious principles.12 These Iraqi Islamists
were keenly aware of local sensitivities and did not attack
the defining characteristic of many Sunni Arabs’ identity—
their tribe. Tribal loyalties had only grown stronger since
the onset of the Iraq War as tribal affiliations became a key
social safety net against the anarchic backdrop.
In addition to its position on tribal affiliations, AQI
also alienated the local population through its brutality
and totalitarian religious governance. In Anbar, where
AQI was particularly strong, attacks on civilians increased by 57 percent between February and August
2006.13 A retrospective on the improvements that the
Sahwa would later bring to Anbar published in Military
Review described AQI as carrying out a “heavy-handed,
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indiscriminate murder and intimidation campaign” in
Ramadi during this period, which alienated the Sunni
tribes.14 In the U.S. Marine Corps official history of the
Anbari Sahwa, the head of an Iraqi women’s nongovernmental organization recalled AQI committing “the
ugliest torture” to intimidate the population. If that
did not work, AQI would slaughter people, sometimes
decapitating them.15
AQI further alienated local Sunnis through its costly approach to the 2005 elections. In the run-up to the
January 2005 provisional elections, some Sunnis in the
insurgency wanted to participate. B WB