Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 | Page 85

AMERICA’S FRONTIER WARS

If we do not, we risk the mistakes of the past. “While
European military revolutions provided states with
the means to project power into the interior of North
America, they did not provide troops with appropriate training and tactics to succeed on the frontier.”16
Therefore, our forces, doctrine, and tactics must continue to embrace agility and adaptability and prepare
for a range of missions. The Army continues to do so
in its most recent doctrinal publications, FM 1 and
FM 30.17 Efforts to address asymmetric threats must
also retain the unique American strengths—superior
training, leadership, and technology—that give us an
edge against any potential adversary.

Finally, we must guard against arrogance. An
account at the time of Braddock’s defeat noted the
irony that his preparations for the march to Fort
Duquesne were precise. He attended to every minute
detail except “the one that mattered most: Indian
affairs.”18 He dismissed those Ohio Indian chiefs who
might have been allies for his expedition as savages who
could not possibly assist disciplined troops. We must
not fall into the same trap of underestimating a potential adversary because of his different culture or
seemingly inferior capability. To do so would be to
repeat the errors of the past with potentially devastating future consequences.

Notes
1. Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and
the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766 (New York,
NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 94-107.
2. Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johns ۈRK\