Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 | Page 83

by Bouquet’s brilliant feigned retreat and flanking
New Threats
maneuvers; it also shows how an enemy can use
We have seen the great utility of examining
deception effectively. The official history of Bushy
historical conflicts between Europeans and Native
Run says Bouquet’s forces were engaged and surAmericans to learn lessons about possible future
rounded by Indian forces at least equal in size to his
conflict. Yet there are two additional dimensions to
own. However, when I toured the battlefield, Indian
asymmetric warfare that must be mentioned—the
re-creators, who have studied the battle extensively
threat of weapons of mass destruction, potentially
from the Indian point of view, maintained that the
used against the American homeland, and of cyberIndians numbered no more than 90 and that the tacattacks on U.S. military, government, and private
tics they used in the forest made their numbers seem
information systems.
larger. This disparity is a good example of attempts
At the heart of asymmetry is the assumption that
to confuse conventional forces so that the size of the
an adversary will choose to attack the weakest point.
opposing force is impossible to discern.
In the case of the United States, asymmetric tools may
Finally, the Indian campaigns provide some excelwell entail terrorist acts—with or without nuclear,
lent examples of the role of technological advances in
biological, or chemical weapons—on the U.S. homeland
asymmetric campaigns. Noted historian Armstrong
designed to disrupt deployments, limit access, erode
Starkey emphasizes that the Europeans arrived in North
public support, and take the fight to the American peoAmerica during a time of military revolution in Europe:
ple. In some respects, this homeland tactic is not new.
“European soldiers brought the new weapons a