Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 | Page 81

AMERICA’S FRONTIER WARS

a combination of these attributes.3 The U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) now
thinks of ways to characterize tomorrow’s asymmetric
challenges.4 In considering its arguments, I was struck
again by the utility of lessons learned from earlier campaigns against Native Americans such as Braddock’s
defeat. So I have matched TRADOC’s insights for the
future with asymmetric examples from the past. Only
by studying the lessons of history are we likely to adapt
to asymmetric challenges.
TRADOC’s analysis begins by stressing the
differences between our current perception of the
future operational environment and what is likely to
be true. Today we think of close combat as involving
deliberate actions conducted at a tempo decided by
the United States and characterized by the application of technology and systems that leaves opponents
virtually helpless to respond or retaliate. Therefore,
the public expects military operations to involve few
casualties and precision attacks, secure our homeland,
and be short-lived. On the contrary, potential adversaries will likely choose to fight in ways that negate
these expectations. Future close combat will be much
more dynamic and lethal, marked by greater intensity,
operational tempo, uncertainty, and psychological
impact. We cannot expect the experience of the Gulf
War to be repeated.

Likely Characteristics of Adversaries
With this as a starting point, TRADOC has discussed attributes a potential enemy is likely to possess:
greater knowledge of the physical conflict environment,
better situational awareness, a clearer understanding of
U.S. military forces, and an ability to adapt quickly to
changing battlefield conditions. These attributes strongly mirror challenges for British, and later American,
soldiers in Indian campaigns of yesteryear.
The physical environment remains the defining
variable of close combat. For U.S. military forces, it
is almost certain that future conflicts will occur in
regions where the enemy has a greater understanding
of the physical environment and has better optimized
his forces to fight. A common characteristic of many
Indian campaigns was the Indians’ superior knowledge
of the terrain. A great example of this was the attack on
the forces of Colonel Henry Bouquet during his march
to relieve Fort Pitt, Pennsylvania, during Pontiac’s War
MILITARY REVIEW  July-August 2014

in August 1763. The Indians attacked in an area of old
growth forest, offering limited fields of fire, around
Bushy Run. They forced Bouquet’s forces back into a
defensive position on a hilltop, attacking the position
repeatedly but without waiting for a counterattack.
Their detailed knowledge of the area allowed them to
simply fade into the forest, suffering few casualties.5
This is but one example of the advantages that accrued
to many Indian tribes through the late 1800s.6
Opposing forces will also have greater situational
awareness in future conflicts. We should expect them
to have human networks operating over telephone
lines or with cellular phones and using commercial
imagery systems. This will be critical, not only because
the adversary can distribute information quickly but
also because crucial information will only be available
through human interaction. The United States, even
with its sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance systems, will have difficulty in complex
settings unless it builds a more effective human intelligence capability in strategically important regions.
Moreover, these new adversaries will learn not only
how to adapt technology but also tactics, formations,
and operations in light of changing battlefield conditions during the course of operations. Such adaptations
will help them counter a precision warfare strategy by
creating uncertainty while also trying to control the
nature and timing of combat engagements.
During the war in Chechnya, the Chechens fought
using few prepared positions, preferring instead, as
Chechen Vice President Yanderbaijev said, to “let the
situation do the organizing.”7 They would move from
city to city to deny Russian maneuver and fire superiority and would use the local population as cover for
their activities.
Similarly, the Seminole Indians adapted continuously during the second Seminole War of 1835-1842.
One noted historian puts it this way: “The second
Seminole War did not follow the precedent set in earlier Indian wars by producing a single dazzling stroke
by a spectacularly brilliant leader. No fewer than seven
American commanders would try and fail to bring
the war to a successful conclusion. When confronted
with superior firepower and at a tactical disadvantage,
the Seminoles simply dispersed into small bands and
continued to fight a guerrilla war … best suited to the
terrain and their own temperament. Where other
79