Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 | Page 32
ADRP 3-0, commanders pursue strategic objectives
through tactical actions. They combine their “skill,
knowledge, experience, and judgment to overcome
the ambiguity and intricacies of a complex, ever
changing, and uncertain operational environment to
better understand the problem or problems at hand.
Operational art … integrates ends, ways, and means,
while accounting for risk.”8
The Air France crew
experienced a sudden torrent
of information—a sort of data
avalanche. … They could not
analyze all of it effectively, and
they lost their lives.
Decisions depend on understanding, understanding
depends on information, and information depends on
data and analysis. As technology has evolved, the Army
has explored various means to provide timely and
relevant information to the commander and staff. For
example, in Vietnam the Army used airborne command and control helicopters.9 Beginning in the 1980s,
the Army began to incorporate information technology
and computer networks.
Mission command systems are an amalgamation
of computer networks, sensor systems, radio networks, and satellite communications. Recent efforts
in the mission command systems community (referring to all developers, users, and stakeholders of
Army information systems) have focused on increasing the sensors and collection networks and their
horizontal and vertical information sharing. As the
systems and networks have grown in size and capacity, they have also grown in complexity. For example,
one major system that supports mission command
is known as Command Post of the Future (CPOF).
This complex computer network comprises over nine
subordinate networks each with its own sensor or
collection network.10 One could argue that CPOF is
a complex system-of-systems by itself. However, it is
30
only one part of any overall systems architecture in
support of mission command—and the systems differ
for every mission because every commander selects
and employs systems based on the mission.
The complexity introduced by such systems is not
limited to their structure. They add to the complexity faced by commanders due to the volume of data
and information they provide. The Army routinely
uses information systems in experiments, rotations at
combat training centers, and real-world operations. In
numerous experiments, training events, and operations, data and information inundate the staff and
commanders—much of it unimportant, inaccurate,
conflicting, or irrelevant. This phenomenon is not
unique to the military. Technology blogger Anukool
Lakhina discusses concerns about businesses losing
key insights in a “big data avalanche” (meaning a rapid
or sudden arrival of big data) coming from information systems while analytics technology remains inadequate for making the data meaningful.11 Department
of Defense (DOD) and Army networks are greater
in size and scope than even the largest corporate
computer networks in terms of inputs and nodes. If
business leaders worry about this problem, perhaps
military leaders should be worried, too, because the
military’s problem is far bigger.
The Air France crew experienced a sudden torrent
of information—a sort of data avalanche. They were
unable to make the decisions that might have saved
their airplane due, in part, to an overwhelming amount
of relevant, irrelevant, conflicting, and inaccurate information. They could not analyze all of it effectively, and
they lost their lives. No doubt Army units using information systems intended to support mission command
have found themselves in a similar state of paralysis due
to excess information.
Proponents of the of Army’s mission command
systems claim their systems allow units to integrate
information vertically and horizontally, share it quickly,
and make faster decisions.12 As championed by Stanley
McChrystal, rapid information sharing should help
soldiers and leaders at each level develop a holistic understanding, gain key insights, and act decisively on the
battlefield.13 All of this is supposed to reduce uncertainty. McChrystal pioneered ways to improve information sharing during operations, but it was the adaptive
leaders trained to receive, process, and act on the
July-August 2014 MILITARY REVIEW