Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 | Page 23
DEFINING FORCE 2025
by the concept developer. The new idea is to establish
a test venue and procedures dictated by the type of
training and unit rather than the developer or evaluator. The testing hub may continue to be the Brigade
Modernization Command at Fort Bliss, but that is
not where the testing stops. Building a process that
rapidly gets the right equipment to the field requires
a menu of options—a series of
tailored exercises that allow developers, testers, and units to work
together to create a better product
in a timely manner.
but we risk losing our overmatch if we continue to
rely on adaptation. The concept of strategic landpower calls for an expeditionary force fully trained and
equipped for the next fight. Force 2025 will guide our
Army to develop the right mix of capabilities to be
regionally engaged and, if the Nation calls, to win
decisively on the battlefield.
Conclusion
Force 2025 and its associated
maneuvers strive to maximize the
use of Army resources. Directed
investment in the development
of future capabilities aligned with
future operational requirements
should drive the design. As a midterm progress review, Force 2025
is needed for the Army to check its
work, make necessary adjustments,
and most importantly, put the right
mix of capabilities on the ground.
The Army of 2020 will sustain
our capabilities in the short term,
UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters assigned to U.S. Army Europe’s 12th Combat Aviation
Brigade land to pick up soldiers during a combined arms live-fire exercise at the Grafenwoehr (Germany) Training Area, 28 March 2014.
(U.S. Army photo by Spc. Glenn M. Anderson, USAREUR Public Affairs)
Notes
1. To read about the strategic landpower concept, see U.S.
Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command
Strategic Landpower Task Force, “Strategic Landpower: Winning
the Clash of Wills,” by Raymond T. Odierno, James F. Amos, and
William H. McRaven, May 2013, http://www.arcic.army.mil/Initiatives/strategic-landpower.aspx.
2. Robert W. Cone, “Strategic Landpower” (lecture, 2013
Association of the United States Army [AUSA] Annual Meeting &
Exposition, Washington, DC, 21 October 2013), http://www.army.
mil/professional/ilw/landpower.html.
3. Ibid.
4. Robert W. Cone, “Shaping the Army of 2020,” Army Magazine (October 2011): 71-76; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-0, The Army Capstone
Concept (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO],
21 December 2009), http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/capstone.pdf.
MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2014
5. U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center white paper,
“Army Vision: Force 2025,” (Washington, DC: GPO, 23 January
2014), http://www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/USArmy_
WhitePaper_Army-Vision-Force-2025_23JAN2014.pdf.
6. For information on unified land operations see Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations
(Washington DC: GPO, May 2012), http://armypubs.army.mil/
doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp3_0.pdf.
7. For more information on network integration evaluations,
see the U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center website, http://
www.arcic.army.mil/Initiatives/network-integration-evaluation.aspx.
8. U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center white paper,
“Army Vision: Force 2025 Maneuvers” (Washington, DC: GPO,
23 January 2014), http://www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/USArmy_WhitePaper_Force-2025-Maneuvers_23JAN2014.pdf.
9. William Hartzog, “A Time for Transformation: Creating
Army XXI,” Army (1 January 1996): 53-59.
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