Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 | Page 105

BOOK REVIEWS

warned in August 1944 when he argued, “there must
not be a large standing army subject to the behest of a
group of schemers. The citizen-soldier is the guarantee
against such a misuse of power.”
The military professional, who paradoxically
prospers and languishes from the all-volunteer force,
will embrace some of Bacevich’s conclusions, while
simultaneously angering at others. The military reader
should not merely cherry-pick those elements of
Bacevich’s argument that seem to elevate the soldier,
but also appreciate their role in this Faustian bargain.
We often believe what is good for the military is good
for the nation (or what is good for our individual
service is good for the nation). Although institutional
parochialism is often unavoidable, we must remain
cognizant that we are here to serve the national interest
and not vice-versa. Finally, America’s agonistic system
of checks and balances must be fueled by meaningful
debate among disagreeing parties. For too long, we have
equated non-support for policy as non-support for the
troops. Although as military professionals we cannot
make policymakers responsible or the population more
engaged, it behooves us to remember that sometimes
the war protestor is our biggest ally and the hawk our
greatest threat.
Maj. David P. Oakley, U.S. Army, Fort Sam
Houston, Texas

CAVALRY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
Edited by Jim Piecuch, Westholme Publishing, LLC,
Yardley, PA, 2012, 281 pages, $29.95
im Piecuch’s Cavalry of the American Revolution is
a fascinating collection of nine essays that visits
the introduction and development of the cavalry
during the American Revolution. The first essay,
Gregory J.W. Urwin’s “The Continental Light
Dragoons, 1776-83,” sets the stage for the subsequent
essays, providing the reader with a comprehensive
overview of the evolution of light cavalry and dragoons
during the Revolutionary War. The remaining essays
cover key milestones in the implementation and use of
light cavalry and dragoons to include the efforts and
exploits of Brig. Gen. Casimir Pulaski, Light Horse
Henry Lee, and Col. Antony White, as well as decisive
MILITARY REVIEW  July-August 2014

battles and campaigns such as the Battle of Cowpens
and the Philadelphia Campaign.
Throughout the reading I found myself gripped
by two themes. The first is the belated recognition
of the tactical value of a mounted force and its slow
development and often catastrophic employment. The
second theme is the American combination and use
of guerrilla tactics and mounted raids against static
British outposts that disrupted Maj. Gen. Cornwallis’s
southern campaign and set the conditions for the
American decisive victories at the battles of Cowpens
and Yorktown.
Gen. Washington’s view of the creation of American
light cavalry and dragoon formations was similar to
the contemporary argument that armor and cavalry
formations are too costly and not compatible with
today’s operational environment. Initially, Washington
did not pressure the Continental Congress to resource
a mounted force, opting instead for artillery to support
his infantry regiments. Washington assumed that the
restrictive New England terrain—with its hills, rivers, and densely forested areas—would neutralize the
maneuver of a mounted force. He also believed that
the cost of feeding horses and equipping a mounted
force was not sustainable and that the Continental
Congress could simply not afford it. Most important,
Washington did not believe the cavalry would be of
much use keeping the British pinned in port cities
of Boston and New York. This tactical oversight put
Washington’s operational plans at risk. Only after being
driven out of New Jersey and New York by British Gen.
Howe, aided by his two regiments of light dragoons, did
Washington recognize the tactical relevancy of having
his own mounted force. He petitioned Congress to field
a cavalry force when he recommended the establishment of one or more corps.
Michael Scoggins’ “South Carolina’s Backcountry
Rangers in the American Revolution” covers the
little known but frequent and bloody skirmishes
between Tory Loyalists led by the infamous Lt. Col.
Tarleton and partisan patriot’s led by brigadier generals Daniel Morgan, Francis Marion, and Thomas
Sumter. These skirmishes are described as a part of
a brutal civil war pitting Loyalists and American
communities against one another throughout the
Carolina back country. The essay also describes
the change of American tactics after the fall of
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