Military Review English Edition January-February 2015 | Page 23
ISAF JOINT COMMAND
close air support, and other enablers on election days.
When evidence of corruption threatened to derail the
whole process, the ISAF Joint Command supported the
United Nations-led audit by transporting nearly 23,000
ballot boxes back to Kabul and by supporting security
at the strategically important Independent Election
Commission warehouses, site of the audit.
New Afghan government. Once the elections were
complete, the ISAF Joint Command supported ANSF
efforts to secure the seating of the new government.
Along with the new president came rumors of Afghan
leadership changes. Rampant speculation created some
turbulence for coalition forces; it was not clear whether
existing ANSF leadership would remain in their current
positions or be replaced. The same held true for key
Afghan ministerial-level leaders. Maintaining neutrality,
coalition forces worked hard to preserve relationships
with the Afghans during this period of great uncertainty.
Shift to Afghan military forces. The ISAF Joint
Command significantly decreased its support to the
ANSF once the run-off and summer-2014 fighting
season were complete. They downsized and consolidated advisory efforts at national command and control
nodes. They reduced enablers—such as air weapons
teams; medical evacuation; intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance; and close air support—that previously were available to the ANSF. The ANSF realized
that they soon would transition from leading security
operations to assuming full security responsibility.
They responded by substituting their own capabilities
for functions formerly performed by the coalition. For
example, they increasingly substituted D-30 artillery
fire (122mm howitzers) for coalition close air support
and their own route clearance assets for ISAF route
clearance patrols.
The ISAF Joint Command steadily shifted ANSF
training requirements to contractors and to the
Afghans themselves in preparation for Resolute
Support and the ANSF’s assumption of full security
responsibility. At the national level, NATO Training
Mission-Afghanistan transitioned counter-improvised
explosive device, combat service support, literacy, and
other contractor-led train-the-trainer programs to the
ANSF. Regional commands (later TAACs) implemented improvised explosive device awareness, tactical air
controllers, and call-for-fire train-the-trainer programs,
placing Afghans in charge of their own training.
MILITARY REVIEW January-February 2015
The ISAF Joint Command socialized all these
changes with the ANSF early enough to manage expectations and prevent surprises. Applying transparency
and candor early paid off. The ANSF had enough time to
start developing their own solutions before coalition assistance ended. The transition occurred early enough—
between August and October—to enable the ISAF Joint
Command to respond to contingencies, which reduced
the probability of the ANSF’s operational or strategic
failure. The Command’s decrease in support shifted
responsibility for the war to the ANSF and helped both
sides adjust to the changing nature of the partnership.
Shifting Mind-Sets
The obvious transitions involved tangible factors,
such as base reductions and troop redeployments. Less
obvious were the transitions in attitude that took place
among the coalition and ANSF. For example, the change
to functionally based SFA required a distinct mental
shift for both sides.
Coalition attitude changes. During Resolute
Support, rather than enabling ANSF combat operations,
coalition forces began to provide institutional-level advisory support through functionally based SFA. Despite
the coalition forces’ “can-do” attitude, they had to come
to terms with their new, more limited role. The same
held true for the decrease in enablers. Coalition forces,
accustomed to supporting their ANSF counterparts, had
to adjust to the fact that they no longer had a combat
role now that the ANSF had full security responsibility
for their country.
Afghan attitude changes. Conversely, Afghans had
to realize that coalition enablers and other support
were a thing of the past. For over 12 years, coalition
forces provided all kinds of assistance during combat
operations. The early transition of regional commands
to TAACs—which coincided with a precipitous reduction in enabler support—confirmed to the ANSF that
coalition assistance would not be as forthcoming as it
once was. The removal of certain capabilities helped
them make the mental transition to the fact that during
Resolute Support, enablers would only be available under extreme circumstances.
New confidence. The ANSF’s performance during
the elections and summer fighting season, besides
proving that they were capable of securing the country, bolstered their confidence and helped them make
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