Military Review English Edition January-February 2015 | Page 23

ISAF JOINT COMMAND close air support, and other enablers on election days. When evidence of corruption threatened to derail the whole process, the ISAF Joint Command supported the United Nations-led audit by transporting nearly 23,000 ballot boxes back to Kabul and by supporting security at the strategically important Independent Election Commission warehouses, site of the audit. New Afghan government. Once the elections were complete, the ISAF Joint Command supported ANSF efforts to secure the seating of the new government. Along with the new president came rumors of Afghan leadership changes. Rampant speculation created some turbulence for coalition forces; it was not clear whether existing ANSF leadership would remain in their current positions or be replaced. The same held true for key Afghan ministerial-level leaders. Maintaining neutrality, coalition forces worked hard to preserve relationships with the Afghans during this period of great uncertainty. Shift to Afghan military forces. The ISAF Joint Command significantly decreased its support to the ANSF once the run-off and summer-2014 fighting season were complete. They downsized and consolidated advisory efforts at national command and control nodes. They reduced enablers—such as air weapons teams; medical evacuation; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and close air support—that previously were available to the ANSF. The ANSF realized that they soon would transition from leading security operations to assuming full security responsibility. They responded by substituting their own capabilities for functions formerly performed by the coalition. For example, they increasingly substituted D-30 artillery fire (122mm howitzers) for coalition close air support and their own route clearance assets for ISAF route clearance patrols. The ISAF Joint Command steadily shifted ANSF training requirements to contractors and to the Afghans themselves in preparation for Resolute Support and the ANSF’s assumption of full security responsibility. At the national level, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan transitioned counter-improvised explosive device, combat service support, literacy, and other contractor-led train-the-trainer programs to the ANSF. Regional commands (later TAACs) implemented improvised explosive device awareness, tactical air controllers, and call-for-fire train-the-trainer programs, placing Afghans in charge of their own training. MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2015 The ISAF Joint Command socialized all these changes with the ANSF early enough to manage expectations and prevent surprises. Applying transparency and candor early paid off. The ANSF had enough time to start developing their own solutions before coalition assistance ended. The transition occurred early enough— between August and October—to enable the ISAF Joint Command to respond to contingencies, which reduced the probability of the ANSF’s operational or strategic failure. The Command’s decrease in support shifted responsibility for the war to the ANSF and helped both sides adjust to the changing nature of the partnership. Shifting Mind-Sets The obvious transitions involved tangible factors, such as base reductions and troop redeployments. Less obvious were the transitions in attitude that took place among the coalition and ANSF. For example, the change to functionally based SFA required a distinct mental shift for both sides. Coalition attitude changes. During Resolute Support, rather than enabling ANSF combat operations, coalition forces began to provide institutional-level advisory support through functionally based SFA. Despite the coalition forces’ “can-do” attitude, they had to come to terms with their new, more limited role. The same held true for the decrease in enablers. Coalition forces, accustomed to supporting their ANSF counterparts, had to adjust to the fact that they no longer had a combat role now that the ANSF had full security responsibility for their country. Afghan attitude changes. Conversely, Afghans had to realize that coalition enablers and other support were a thing of the past. For over 12 years, coalition forces provided all kinds of assistance during combat operations. The early transition of regional commands to TAACs—which coincided with a precipitous reduction in enabler support—confirmed to the ANSF that coalition assistance would not be as forthcoming as it once was. The removal of certain capabilities helped them make the mental transition to the fact that during Resolute Support, enablers would only be available under extreme circumstances. New confidence. The ANSF’s performance during the elections and summer fighting season, besides proving that they were capable of securing the country, bolstered their confidence and helped them make 21