Military Review English Edition January-February 2015 | Page 19

ISAF JOINT COMMAND

2003, many Army units struggled to make the mental
and physical shifts from major combat operations to
counterinsurgency.
This article discusses how the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command managed
transitions at the operational level during the shift
from Operation Enduring Freedom to the NATO-led
Resolute Support mission in 2014. The experience offers
seven lessons learned:
Plan early and often.
Build flexibility into plans.
Be as transparent as possible.
Integrate transitions across lines of operation, and
synchronize them with operations in support of campaign objectives.
Ensure key leaders play an active role managing
both imposed and conditions-based transitions.
Adjust staff processes to account for increased
requirements during the transition process.
Design organizations and processes with consideration for their short- and long-term consequences.
Although the focus of this discussion is on counterinsurgency, these lessons can be applied to future
contingencies across the range of military operations.
Not all transitions are created equal, but transitions
are a part of all military operations. The experiences of
the ISAF Joint Command, together with similar experiences during drawdowns in Iraq and elsewhere, beg the
question: What should military forces do, if anything,
to prepare for the inevitable transitions that will occur
during a campaign? Moreover, how should units plan
for, manage, and execute the myriad transitions they will
encounter?
To answer these questions, the U.S. Army needs to
develop better doctrine and training on conducting and
managing transitions. It needs to explore transitions
through rigorous academic study so that forces can
ensure transitions support tactical as well as operational
and strategic objectives. The experiences of the ISAF
Joint Command provide a starting point. These experiences and lessons can inform future leaders’ efforts to
oversee their own transitions so they can better anticipate challenges and capitalize on the opportunities.

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Reducing Force Posture
In the final year of Operation Enduring Freedom, the
ISAF Joint Command adjusted its force posture to set
MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2015

the conditions for the transition to Resolute Support by
closing or transferring 75 bases, retrograding over 77,000
pieces of rolling and non-rolling stock, and redeploying
over 90,000 personnel—including military, civilian, and
contractors—from 48 troop-contributing nations.
Base closures and transfers. The ISAF Joint
Command reviewed in detail the effects base closures
and transfers would have on its operational reach and on
the Afghan National Security Forces’ (ANSF’s) support structure. They balanced the ANSF’s eagerness to
assume control of the ISAF footprint with the concern
that too many ANSF bases would render them a static
force. The Command developed detailed criteria to
determine which strategic bases would remain, which
would be closed or transferred, and in what sequence.
In cases where property would transfer, the ISAF
Joint Command worked closely with commanders
on the ground and the Afghan-led Joint Base Closure
Commission to develop plans and procedures for base
transfers, including identifying real property and infrastructure that would go to the Afghans.
Retrograde and redeployment. In a process similar
to base closure efforts, the ISAF Joint Command balanced retrograde and redeployment tasks with current
operations to set conditions for Resolute Support. The
task was monumental given the sheer amount of equipment and personnel involved.
Early in the year, commanders of the NATO regional commands maintained discretion to determine
operational equipment requirements. Regional commanders, loathe to lose flexibility, were reluctant to
release resources that they might need later in the year.
Unfortunately, the closer the 31 December 2014 deadline came,