Military Review English Edition January-February 2015 | Page 144

This book is well written, follows logical paths, and
does not require the reader to be an expert in future
technologies, history, or philosophy—though these
could be helpful—to understand the issues raised by
the author.
Nevertheless, I found this a challenging read because this topic is dealt with in such vast breadth and
depth by the author. He brings so many issues into
the discussion that I found this book to be a study. It
quickly caught my attention and, from this reading,
I gained a better insight into the national, and possibly global, discussion of the future directions of war
and warfare. This book is for military professionals,
futurists, policy formulators, and the scientific community who are developing these new technologies
and capabilities.
Lt. Col. Terrance M. Portman, U.S. Marine
Corps, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

AN INOFFENSIVE REARMAMENT: The Making
of the Postwar Japanese Army
Frank Kowalski, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis,
Maryland, 2013, 224 pages

A

reader that experienced the occupations
of Iraq or Afghanistan will appreciate An
Inoffensive Rearmament. Written by a key
leader charged to develop the National Police Reserve
(later the Self-Defense Forces) in post-World War
II Japan, the work provides remarkable insights into
how the United States handled a partner nation that
was once an enemy. Translated from the original
Japanese, the work balances the political scene and
mercurial relationship between post-World War II
Japan and pre-Korean War United States.
Japan, the book’s hero, once a great nation, was
burned physically and spiritually by the worst of war
but was seeking to build a utopia from the ashes.
The United States, a proven international power and
Japan’s dramatic foil, sought to enable this utopian
dream through occupation. One soon realizes that
U.S. occupation policy has remained largely unchanged from 1945 through current operations by
always forcing the defeated nation into serving as a
weakened, pro-American client.
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Following the war, Japan sought to reestablish
sovereign legitimacy by shifting its governance from
the whims of an emperor and military elite to a
constitution which merely limited self-defense capability. Japan hoped that a new U.S.-led international
world order would prevent future conflict by honoring Japanese passive “higher ideals.” Squashing future
imperial ambitions, Japan would never seek conflict
beyond its borders again.
The United States, in contrast, occupied Japan
to establish an impotent, American-modeled client
state. In a punitive sense, and under United Nations
directive, MacArthur prohibited a new Japanese
Army due to its history, not its future. What nation
would dare reconsider war after suffering global conflict and the atom bomb? The Japanese Diet (national legislature) staunchly resisted an American-made
constitution banning the right to self-defense until
Hirohito ordered acquiescence.
Consequently, Japan would depend on U.S. power
for security through four U.S. divisions stationed
throughout the islands. This situation worked only
until the outbreak of war in Korea which forced
the divisions’ departure. With no U.S. troops, an
imminent communist threat from China, and no
legal means to stand up a response, Japan was left
defenseless. The American occupiers scrambled to
organize a new host-nation defense force by scraping
together raw recruits and leadership using enough
political sleight of hand to keep many from questioning the clear violation of the Japanese constitution
and U.N. mandate.
Here, the reader senses a trend in U.S. occupation policy that echoes policies dealing with Iraq
and Afghanistan. In all cases, the United States
destroys the enemy military and purges its remaining leadership, only to stumble on a self-induced
defense vacuum. Peace treaties constrain who can
fill this gap and how it can be done.
The U.S. military, seeking a reduced commitment, is then forced to cobble together a force
of unskilled soldiers and inadequate leadership.
Former enemies are turned into crippled friends
who must depend on U.S. collaboration as the only
path to international esteem, security, and regional
influence. Further, the United States leveraged the
staunchly democratic and fairly stable islands of
January-February 2015  MILITARY REVIEW