Military Review English Edition January-February 2014 | Page 75

LESSONS LEARNED

Lesson 10: There always is room for improvement. New Zealand forces have developed a culture
of continuous improvement. Processes, tools, and
resources for review, reflection, and improvement
are well established and well used. Numerous discussion forums, after action reviews, periodicals, and
other resources make it easy for commanders, staff,
and operators at all levels to improve operations.
However, there is always room to grow. Individuals and organizations can pursue excellence in the
profession of arms through an attitude of continuous improvement. The temptation to rest on one’s
laurels and avoid self-critique is great. However, no
person, organization, custom, system, or idea should
be considered exempt from criticism, including the
very processes used for improvement.

Conclusion
It is easy to blame perceived deficiencies in
military education and training when the situation on the ground bears little resemblance to
one’s studies. Nonetheless, military education
and training, no matter how up-to-date, cannot
ensure soldiers are prepared for all situations
they will face in the field. Education and training
would be truly deficient if they did not prepare
soldiers to learn continuously and exercise judgment. This does not remove the need for military
education and training to evolve so they meet
the needs of current operations. The sharing of
lessons learned can contribute to this evolution
and increase the likelihood of successful COIN
and stabilization. MR

NOTES
1. An austere New Zealand Defence Force military engineering commitment
was made toward reconstruction in Iraq from 2003–2004, and the force provides
individual United Nations military advisors to Iraq.
2. New Zealand special operations forces have been committed toward Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF efforts in Afghanistan since October 2001, in
one guise or another, and other individual augmentees to various task forces and
headquarters have directly contributed toward the coalition mission in Afghanistan.
3. COIN Common Sense 3, Issue 2, “The Realist: An Interview With Dr. Ashraf
Ghani,” July 2012, 7.
4. CALL Handbook no. 11-16, Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team
Handbook, February 2011, 23, provides a partial solution when it emphasizes the
importance of a multi-year “strategy that includes . . . a long term end state goal.”
5. See COIN Common Sense 1, Issue 3, July 2010, for several examples of
these non-traditional efforts.

MILITARY REVIEW

January-February 2014

CALL Reference Guide no. 11-39, BCT-PRT “Unity of Effort” Reference Guide,
allocates a chapter to approaches, outlining the importance of how tasks are accomplished within the eyes of the host nation.
6. Raymond D. Barrett explores the nature of interagency coordination further
in his article “Dynamics of Interagency Teams,” Military Review (March-April 2013).
7. See Paul Muggleton and Bruce Oswald’s occasional paper 5/2011: “Counterinsurgency and Certain Legal Aspects: a Snapshot of Afghanistan,” (Asia-Pacific
Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, 2011).
8. See Michael T. Flynn and Charles A. Flynn, “Integrating Intelligence and Information; Ten Points for the Commander,” Military Review (January-February 2012).
9. Fire, move, and sustain functions were heavily emphasized in the New
Zealand Army Grade III and Grade II staff and tactics courses, which are compulsory milestones for all first lieutenants and captains as part of their professional
military education.

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