Military Review English Edition January-February 2014

LESSONS LEARNED Lesson 4: Military forces need to build good relationships with stakeholders outside their chain of command. Bamyan bordered four regional commands and no fewer than ﬁve different lead nations for PRTs within the eight provinces surrounding it. New Zealand forces learned the importance of not only working within the regional command (east) guidelines and direction, but also of understanding groups to the north, west, and south. (In contrast to coalition military partners, Afghans usually had little concern with boundaries as they appeared on maps.) Nesting efforts within the ISAF joint command’s annual and seasonal plans reduced problems, but nothing beat faceto-face meetings and regular communication with neighboring groups. Lateral coordination was as important as vertical. Lesson 5: Soldiers must be able to exercise initiative at the tactical level consistent with strategic direction. The ability to apply strategic-level guidance directly and quickly at the tactical level extends beyond how leaders normally interpret mission command. Regardless, it was common for units to receive direction or constraints from the highest levels (either within ISAF or from a national level) and within hours apply parts of that direction at the tactical level. Bypassing formal direction from the next higher headquarters rather than waiting for formal orders happened frequently because of time constraints. This is the new reality: to adapt rapidly, forces must rethink the interpretation of mission command in relation to tactical actions. The unofﬁcial term stractics expresses a linkage between the strategic direction of a force and its operations at the tactical level. Lesson 6: Military operations support civil functions. Military leaders must consider how military missions support short- and long-term civil functions, and they must understand those functions. Military missions do not ensure successful stabilization or COIN. Long-term success in Afghanistan depends on effective nonmilitary functions. Lines of effort not traditionally considered military, such as anticorruption, counternarcotics, gender equality, insurgent ﬁnancial tracking, justice sector development, and reintegration and reconciliation are critical to the success of the Afghan government and military forces.5 MILITARY REVIEW January-February 2014 A corollary to this lesson is that how forces conduct a COIN or stability mission can be just as important as the end state. Military missions presumed successful can affect civil functions in a host nation for better or for worse. The process and the means used can have unintended consequences to the host nation (as can the end state). Military missions should not be performed in isolation. The philosophy of mission command emphasizes allowing subordinates freedom to determine how they will accomplish tasks. In Afghanistan, it became evident that mission command could lead to accomplishment of a military mission that eventually would become detrimental to the civil function it should have supported. Military leaders must consider how their tactics, techniques, and procedures affect partners and the host nation. The unofﬁcial term stractics expresses a linkage between the strategic direction of a force and its operations at the tactical level. Lesson 7: Military forces should seek unity of purpose among civilian and military partners. Command and control applies to military forces but not necessarily to civil-military partnerships. A simple wiring diagram cannot express the nonlinear relationships common among the numerous stakeholders, let alone assure coordination among them. Unity of effort likely will be impossible because synchronization and integration are so difﬁcult to achieve. Achieving unity of purpose is more pragmatic.6 The approximately 250-member Bamyan PRT truly was an interagency and multinational entity. It was common to interact with partners from the United States Agency for International Development, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Malaysian Armed Forces, and European Union police daily. Each organization had an independent chain of command extending to a 71

Military Review English Edition January-February 2014 | Page 73