Military Review English Edition January-February 2014 | Page 60
as legitimate by their publics. The solution is
. . . the steady accumulation of actions and
results that build trust and credibility over
time.55
To enlist the cooperation of Africa in achieving its
interests, the U.S. should formalize good relations
with all African states and design a framework that
harmonizes their security interests, which includes
Africa’s human-security needs. This requires an
operational paradigm shift from primarily selective bilateral military policy to one that prioritizes
collaborative and multilateral actions with both
Africa and global partners. All African states’
issues demand equal attention if the United States
is to obviate the imminent threats to its interests in
Africa. The challenges we face today are complex
and demand collective efforts and use of both hard
and soft powers. Selectivity and militarization
alone would fail to overcome these challenges. It
is prudent the United States debunks its neorealist “hard power” policy and adopts liberal “soft
power” policies in line with its idealist values and
ends to capture Africa’s support in fulfilling its strategic aspirations on the continent. President Bush
acknowledged the ineffectiveness of America’s
over-reliance on force alone as a foreign policy,
stating that the promotion of freedom was “not
primarily the task of arms,” and the United States
would not impose its own style of government
upon the world. “Our goal instead is to help others
find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and
make their own way.”56 To demonstrate real commitment to develop a new partnership with Africa,
the United States needs to redirect the focus away
from strengthening military capacity and toward
promoting human development in Africa. The
United States, as the only super power in a unipolar
world, stands to benefit from a stable, developed,
and peaceful Africa. The United States could help
create the conditions needed for peace and stability by restricting the flow of military weapons and
training and increasing support for sustainable
development policies. The United States can also
champion a cause of international arms sales code
of conduct based on human rights, nonaggression,
and democracy. The United States should provide
increased development assistance to Africa and
encourage civil-society building.
Conclusion
The United States increased military involvement
in Africa to suppress terrorism, seek energy sources,
and counter China’s influence in Africa. Other
nations conceptualized these actions as exploitative
and imperialistic, aimed at controlling Africa’s
energy resources. The U.S. involvement also raised
concerns about challenges to sovereignty, welfare,
and the survival of the African Union. America’s
covert and overt military alliances and joint operations with selected military allies affected spillage,
intensity, protractedness, and duration of the Congo,
Sudan, and Darfur conflicts. The U.S. militarization
policy has backfired, undermining the attainment of
its strategic interests. To elicit Africa’s support, the
United States needs to debunk its neorealist “hard
power” policy and adopt liberal “soft power” policies such as assisting Africa in its socio-political
economic development. MR
NOTES
1. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 1995, “U.S.
Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa,” .
2. David Wiley, 2012, “Militarizing Africa and African Studies and the U.S.
Africanists Response,” African Studies Review, 55 (2): 147-61
3. Stephanie McCrummen, 2008, Report: U.S. Africa Aid is Increasingly Military, Washington Post Foreign Service, .
4. “Making Peace or Fueling War in Africa,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 13
March 2009.
5. Susan E. Rice, 2001, Testimony before the subcommittee on Africa of
the international relations committee, United States House of Representatives.
6. M.G. Marshall, Global Terrorism: An Overview and Analysis, Report from
the Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of
Maryland, 2002, .
7. Ibid.
8. Anthony Lake and Christian T. Whitman, chairs; Princeton N. Lyman and
Stephen Morrison, project directors, More Than Humanitarianism: A Strategic
U.S. Approach Toward Africa (New York: Council of Foreign Affairs, 2006), xiii.
58
9. Ibid.
10. Amendee Bollee, “Djibouti: From French Outpost to U.S. Base,” Review of
African Political Economy 30, no. 97 (2003).
11. Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfi eld, “Power Politics and International
Trade,” American Political Science Review 87(1993): 408-20.
12. John Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, “The Classical Liberals Were Right:
Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985,” International Studies
Quarterly 41 (1997).
13. Lake, Whitman, Lyman, and Morrison, 31.
14. Princeton N. Lyman and Dorff Patricia, Beyond Humanitarianism: What
You Need to Know About Africa and Why It Matters (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), ix.
15. Ibid.
16. McCrummen.
17. Judah Grunstein, “The Militarization of American Foreign Policy” World
Politics Review (2008). .
18. Bollee.
19. “Making Peace or Fueling War in Africa.”
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