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as legitimate by their publics. The solution is . . . the steady accumulation of actions and results that build trust and credibility over time.55 To enlist the cooperation of Africa in achieving its interests, the U.S. should formalize good relations with all African states and design a framework that harmonizes their security interests, which includes Africa’s human-security needs. This requires an operational paradigm shift from primarily selective bilateral military policy to one that prioritizes collaborative and multilateral actions with both Africa and global partners. All African states’ issues demand equal attention if the United States is to obviate the imminent threats to its interests in Africa. The challenges we face today are complex and demand collective efforts and use of both hard and soft powers. Selectivity and militarization alone would fail to overcome these challenges. It is prudent the United States debunks its neorealist “hard power” policy and adopts liberal “soft power” policies in line with its idealist values and ends to capture Africa’s support in fulfilling its strategic aspirations on the continent. President Bush acknowledged the ineffectiveness of America’s over-reliance on force alone as a foreign policy, stating that the promotion of freedom was “not primarily the task of arms,” and the United States would not impose its own style of government upon the world. “Our goal instead is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way.”56 To demonstrate real commitment to develop a new partnership with Africa, the United States needs to redirect the focus away from strengthening military capacity and toward promoting human development in Africa. The United States, as the only super power in a unipolar world, stands to benefit from a stable, developed, and peaceful Africa. The United States could help create the conditions needed for peace and stability by restricting the flow of military weapons and training and increasing support for sustainable development policies. The United States can also champion a cause of international arms sales code of conduct based on human rights, nonaggression, and democracy. The United States should provide increased development assistance to Africa and encourage civil-society building. Conclusion The United States increased military involvement in Africa to suppress terrorism, seek energy sources, and counter China’s influence in Africa. Other nations conceptualized these actions as exploitative and imperialistic, aimed at controlling Africa’s energy resources. The U.S. involvement also raised concerns about challenges to sovereignty, welfare, and the survival of the African Union. America’s covert and overt military alliances and joint operations with selected military allies affected spillage, intensity, protractedness, and duration of the Congo, Sudan, and Darfur conflicts. The U.S. militarization policy has backfired, undermining the attainment of its strategic interests. To elicit Africa’s support, the United States needs to debunk its neorealist “hard power” policy and adopt liberal “soft power” policies such as assisting Africa in its socio-political economic development. MR NOTES 1. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 1995, “U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa,” . 2. David Wiley, 2012, “Militarizing Africa and African Studies and the U.S. Africanists Response,” African Studies Review, 55 (2): 147-61 3. Stephanie McCrummen, 2008, Report: U.S. Africa Aid is Increasingly Military, Washington Post Foreign Service, . 4. “Making Peace or Fueling War in Africa,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 13 March 2009. 5. Susan E. Rice, 2001, Testimony before the subcommittee on Africa of the international relations committee, United States House of Representatives. 6. M.G. Marshall, Global Terrorism: An Overview and Analysis, Report from the Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2002, . 7. Ibid. 8. Anthony Lake and Christian T. Whitman, chairs; Princeton N. Lyman and Stephen Morrison, project directors, More Than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach Toward Africa (New York: Council of Foreign Affairs, 2006), xiii. 58 9. Ibid. 10. Amendee Bollee, “Djibouti: From French Outpost to U.S. Base,” Review of African Political Economy 30, no. 97 (2003). 11. Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfi eld, “Power Politics and International Trade,” American Political Science Review 87(1993): 408-20. 12. John Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985,” International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997). 13. Lake, Whitman, Lyman, and Morrison, 31. 14. Princeton N. Lyman and Dorff Patricia, Beyond Humanitarianism: What You Need to Know About Africa and Why It Matters (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), ix. 15. Ibid. 16. McCrummen. 17. Judah Grunstein, “The Militarization of American Foreign Policy” World Politics Review (2008). . 18. Bollee. 19. “Making Peace or Fueling War in Africa.” January-February 2014 MILITARY REVIEW