Military Review English Edition January-February 2014 | Page 56

Al-Qaeda and affiliated suspects in Sudan from
2002 to mid-2003.27 The United States backed the
insurgency by the Sudan People’s Liberation, the
guerrilla force that fought the northern Khartoum
government, but the Bush government allied with
the Khartoum government in the U.S.-led Global
War on Terrorism.”28
Darfur reportedly has the fourth-largest copper
and third-largest uranium deposits in the world.29
Sudan is China’s fourth biggest supplier of
imported oil. U.S. companies controlling the pipelines in Chad and Uganda seek to displace China
through the U.S. military alliance with “frontline”
states hostile to Sudan—Uganda, Chad, and
Ethiopia.30 America’s increasing militarization of
its foreign policy globally has been criticized by
some American foreign policy decision makers
and practitioners.

Strategic Gain or Backlash?
Despite some short-term modicum of success
like the flow of oil from strategic allies such as
Nigeria and Angola or the killing of leading terrorists figures in Africa, U.S. militarization policy
has elicited backlash against its strategic interests
on the continent. Defense Secretary Gates warns
against the risk of a “creeping militarization” of
U.S. foreign policy and recommends the State
Department lead U.S. engagement with other countries. Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann denounces
the progressive militarization of U.S. foreign
policy over the past 20 years and underlines the
perils it has wrought.31 According to Mark Malan
“The danger is this strategy will not achieve the
security objectives of addressing the root causes of
terrorism, and it certainly won’t address the developmental objectives of U.S. foreign policy.”32 We
observe mounting adverse ramifications for U.S.
geo-strategic security interests in Africa.
America’s Cold War military policy correlates
with contemporary cycles of violence, crimes,
and conflicts plaguing Africa today. Throughout
the Cold War (1950-1989), the United States
delivered over $1.5 billion worth of weaponry to
its top arms clients—Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and
Zaire (DRC)—that constitute the flashpoints of
violence, instability, and state collapse in Africa.
The ongoing DRC civil war exemplifies the devastating legacy of U.S. arms sales policy to Africa.33
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The U.S. military sustained the violent regime of
Mobutu Sese Seko— who brutalized Zairians and
plundered the economy for three decades—with
military arms ($300 million) and training (worth
$100 million) until overthrown by Laurent Kabila’s
forces in 1997.34
U.S. weapons transfers and continued military
training to parties of the conflict have helped
fuel the fighting. The United States helped build
the militaries of eight of the nine states directly
involved in the war that has ravaged the DRC since
Kabila’s coup. In 1998 alone, U.S. weapons to
Africa totaled $12.5 million, including substantial
deliveries to Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe—all
backing Kabila. On the rebel side, Uganda received
nearly $1.5 million in weaponry over the past two
years, and Rwanda was importing U.S. weapons as
late as 1993 (one year before the brutal genocide
erupted).
U.S. military transfers in the form of direct
government-to-government weapons deliveries,
commercial sales, and funds from the International
Military Education and Training (IMET) program
to the states directly involved in t he DRC conflict
has totaled more than $125 million since the end
of the Cold War.35
Somalia is now a failed state and, like Sudan, it
has become a den for terrorism and other criminal
activities such as piracy, threatening America’s strategic interests. U.S. arms sales and military training
for officers of strategic allies correlate human rights
violations, poor governance, and anti-democratic
coups in Africa. An IMET trainee, Capt. Amadou
Sanogo, led the antidemocratic coup in Mali in
March 2012. This ignited U.S. congressional concerns that the United States “may not be adequately
assessing long-term risks associated with providing
training and military equipment for counterterrorism purposes to countries with poor records of
human rights, rule of law, and accountability.”36
The U.S. discriminatory selection of countries
participating in African Crisis Response Initiative bred animosity and tension among African
countries. The division undermined Africa’s collective efforts to confront emerging threats on the
continent. Non-U.S. security allies do not cooperate with the United States. Moreover, some U.S.
allies, informed by the U.S. foreign policy axiom
of permanency of interests, are suspicious of U.S.
January-February 2014 MILITARY REVIEW