Military Review English Edition January-February 2014 | Page 54

that steals crude oil and kidnaps foreign oil workers for ransom in the Delta region, threaten U.S. investments and oil supplies.13 In a realist world, countering the influence of its strategic rivals, especially China, reminiscent of the Cold War, has renewed U.S. interest in Africa. The rapidly growing economies of countries such as Malaysia and China strategically compete with America for Africa’s energy and other natural resources. China, in particular, poses a formidable challenge to U.S. interests in Africa. African leaders seem to cater to China because its aid and China… poses a formidable challenge to U.S. interests in Africa. investment in Africa exclude conditionality such as good governance and human rights commonly associated with U.S. investment programs, which are viewed by African leaders as imperialistic and neocolonialistic.14 China’s investment approach offers Africa equal opportunity and stake in their development in view of China’s subtle diplomacy of noninterference in Africa’s domestic issues. China’s investment and aid programs have been well received because they include infrastructure projects, long ignored by the United States and other Western aid programs.15 U.S. Military Involvement in Africa U.S. aid to Africa has been observed to be increasingly militarized.16 In fact, its military is involved in a range of activities that were perceived to be the exclusive prerogative of civilian agencies and organizations in the past.17 America’s military involvement in Africa includes— ● Sales of arms. ● Military training and advice. ● Establishment of security commands and intelligence. 52 ● Joint overt and covert military operations with selected security allies. In 1996, the United States launched the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) program to address challenges of peacekeeping and conflict management in Africa. Fears that the ethnic massacres occurring in Rwanda in 1994 might also occur in neighboring Burundi prompted its formation. In addition, America’s reluctance to get involved in African local conflicts following the 1993 Somali debacle where 18 U.S. Army rangers died in Somalia. The ACRI enabled selected African military forces to respond to crises through peacekeeping missions in Africa. The selection criteria of countries participating were democratic governance and the preparedness of the military to submit to civilian control. Benin, Ghana, Senegal, Malawi, and Mali were the countries selected. Several countries initially considered for participation became ineligible. However, because Uganda and Ethiopia were U.S. military allies they were included in the selection even though they did not pass the test. Several antiterrorism programs were initiated, including the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, consisting of 1,200 to 1,800 U.S. and allied troops in Djibouti to patrol, interdict, and strike at threatening targets in the Horn of Africa.18 The task force led the U.S. engagement with Somalia,, establishing three permanent contingency operating locations at Kenyan’s Manda Bay Naval Base and Hurso and Bilate in Ethiopia. From these locations the task force trained allied troops and initiated attacks on Somalia.19 The Pan Sahel Initiative deployed U.S. Special Army Forces with the Special Command Europe to Mali and Mauritania, engaging in counterinsurgency wars in Mali and Niger against the Tuareg rebels. The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative that replaced the Pan Sahel Initiative in 2004 has American military personnel assigned to 11 African nations—Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal—to counter the activities of Islamist militants in the Sahel Sahara region in Northwest Africa. For example, American forces, in a joint operation with Chadian forces, killed 43 alleged militants in the Chad-Niger border.20 The Joint Task Force Aztec Silence, created in December 2003, under the European Command, conducts surveillance operations a nd, in coordination with January-February 2014 MILITARY REVIEW