Military Review English Edition January-February 2014

T H E A F G H A N S TAT E Jessica Patterson, center, with the U.S. Department of State, speaks with the subgovernor and Afghan elders before a shura, or meeting, in the village of Spina, Omna District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan, 28 October 2011. (U.S. Army, Spc. Jacob Kohrs) state’s functional role in each of them—its degree of penetration and the proposed extent of managing social relations—was more expansive than previous states. In addition, many priority areas of operation were far more remote than those previous Afghan states had controlled directly. When marines cleared Nawa in the summer of 2009 in what McChrystal saw as a “proof of concept” for the counterinsurgency campaign, service delivery came in the form of schools, jobs programs, and other services. This service delivery was identiﬁed as a key factor to ensure that, even if Marines moved on to clear other areas, the Taliban would not be able to return.35 One of the most prominent manifestations of this “extend the government” ethos was the spring 2010 operation to take Marjah, “a farming community,” in Chandrasekaran’s words, in Helmand Province. After an initial “clearing” phase by U.S. marines, in which Lt. Col. Cal Worth was quoted at the beginning of this piece, a “government in a box” arrived, led by a new district governor. About a month after the operation began, MILITARY REVIEW January-February 2014 Hamid Karzai personiﬁed undesired state reach by touring Marjah with abusive former Governor Sher Muhammad Akhundzada and former police chief Abdul Rahman Jan.36 American civilians thought in terms similar to the military. Chandrasekaran writes, “What the Afghans really needed, in the view of almost every U.S. official involved in the war were more Afghan civil servants at the local level. They wanted . . . reopened schools, a functioning health clinic, a clerk to issue identiﬁcation cards, and agricultural assistance.”37 In drafting a list of initiatives that it wanted to see from the central government, the U.S. State Department was explicit in the need to appoint ofﬁcials to local-level appointments and to deliver services.38 Although few civil servants showed up, the United States worked assiduously to empower those who did. Haji Abdul Jabar, for example, was Kandahar Province’s Arghandab district governor and served as the main conduit for American development assistance to Arghandab. 39

Military Review English Edition January-February 2014 | Page 41