Military Review English Edition January-February 2014 | Page 38

Overall, FM 3-24 says the state is intrinsically
good, and more is better; that which is outside the
state and those disinclined to submit to the comprehensive rule of the state deviant. In the absence
of any qualifying commentary, FM 3-24 adds up to
a directive to pursue the Western-ideal-type state:
maximal sovereignty and autonomy, and deeply
penetrative, solely responsible for managing social
relations and resources. Sociopolitical consciousness and international recognition are assumed.

State and Society in Afghanistan
According to FM 3-24, violence and instability
in Afghanistan is a product of the Afghan state’s
deviation from the Western-ideal type. Yet, despite
significant periods of stability, Afghanistan has
never had this type of state. Anthropologist Thomas
Barfield compares the Western-ideal type to American cheese: consistent and dominant throughout all
of Afghanistan’s territory, without gaps. Successful
Afghan states, such as Musahiban dynasty’s from
1929 to 1978, Barfield observes, have been more
akin to Swiss cheese, where gaps and inconsistencies are essential features of the product.17 Attempts
to construct an American cheese-type state have
not stabilized the country. Rather, they have met
resistance and have more often than not failed.
This Swiss cheese model scores differently than
Western states among Nettl’s conceptual variables.
It resembles Migdal’s mélange, where his basic
state capacities—social penetration and regulation,
and resource extraction and appropriate—are much
reduced or distributed across nonstate actors. The
state, as Barfield explains, traditionally has been the
domain of particular elite lineages and not accessible to the masses. Authorities and territory could
be transferred through inheritance, gifts, and peace
agreements. The periphery did not participate in the
contest for control over the state. The local leaders
could keep local power so long as they submitted
to the center.18 Although limited participation in
the state amounted to a certain amount of state
autonomy, the state was not entirely sovereign over
remote areas.19 It minimally penetrated society in
these parts, and allowed others to regulate social
relations and extract and appropriate resources.
In Barfield’s words, these areas did not need to
be “ruled directly or subjected to the same style
of government” as more productive areas. The
36

state could use economic, political, and coercive
inducements to keep these areas inline without
administering them directly. This is precisely the
opposite of the counterinsurgency field manual’s
recommendation to extend the government. Rather
than bringing the state to the people, each left the
other alone.
The relationship between stability and limitations
on state authority is traced to Ahmed Shah Durrani,
who in 1747 became the first person to rule the territory that is now Afghanistan. Although Durrani
spent lavishly on his military, his state was not the
single dominant actor throughout Afghanistan. For
example, he was obliged to supply leaders of his
own Durrani tribe with cash or land in exchange
for about two-thirds of his troops. These irregular
troops were loath to spend more than a year in
service.20 In addition to tax exemptions, the state
did not interfere with Durrani tribal social practices
or other resources. In non-Durrani areas, the state
extracted heavy taxes but no troops. As in Durrani
areas, it left social regulation to others.21 In sum, the

Ahmed Shah Durrani, 18th century illustration.
January-February 2014 MILITARY REVIEW