Military Review English Edition January-February 2014 | Page 32

community engagement takes place as well as an
assessment of the area by U.S. Special Operations
Forces in partnership with GIRoA and Afghan
National Security Forces. The point of this endeavor
is twofold: it determines the sources of community
instability the insurgency feeds off to buttress its
efforts, and it identifies areas to establish local stability. In this program, village elders nominate Afghan
Local Police recruits, and the district chief of police
vets them and forwards their names to the Ministry
of Interior for a final check. A village elder vouches
for each recruit’s character, and each recruit agrees to
abstain from taking drugs and to participate in a training regimen administered by U.S. Special Operations
Forces. The recruit is photographed, the particulars
of his family are chronicled, and he is biometrically
enrolled by having his iris scanned. He then begins
several weeks of training involving weapons familiarization and safety, physical endurance, small unit
tactics, ethics, checkpoint construction, and the duties
that come from being a member of a local protective
force. Once trained, the new local policeman reports
to the Afghan Local Police commander for the district. He receives his assignment to a checkpoint in
his community where he uses his government-issued
and recorded weapon to prevent insurgent intimidation of the community. In addition to uniforms, the

force members receive a limited number of trucks and
motorcycles for mobility and to man checkpoints, and
are sometimes issued PKM machine guns if they are
in areas more likely to receive Taliban contact. Each
checkpoint has a dedicated commander who reports
to the Afghan Local Police commander, and they use
coalition-provided radios to maintain contact. Each
police officer receives his regular salary, a smaller
portion of a regular Afghan National Police paycheck,
and logistical and security support from the district
chief of police to ensure a basic level of government
control of these forces.

Shahid-e-Hasas: 2012
By the end of 2006, the insurgency surrounded
FOB Kaufman. Insurgent fighters mined the main
roads leading from the base to the surrounding district and were emboldened by greater numbers and
greater discipline, as well by the skills foreign fighters
brought to the battlefield. Local villagers fled the area,
enlisted with the Taliban, or were coerced to work for
the insurgency. Beginning in 2010, there was a concerted effort by U.S. and Afghan forces to push out
beyond FOB Kaufman, to engage with local leaders,
and to raise an Afghan Local Police force. It began
by increasing the number of Special Forces teams
in the area from one to four and establishing small

Coalition members visit Afghan Local Police bazaar checkpoint.
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January-February 2014 MILITARY REVIEW