Military Review English Edition January-February 2014

For example, U.S. Army soldiers role-playing cartels, or nonstate terrorist actors, remains decidedly non-Western in how they conceptualize, plan, narco-criminals should not view moving drug and execute operations, a larger question remains. material the same as moving ammunition or supShould our opposing forces in training abandon our plies. Instead, we must motivate them in some way planning methodologies and utilize select aspects by proﬁt and competition where the commanding of rival ones to achieve greater training realism? headquarters rewards successful “criminals” in the Could our opposing forces become better replica- training event. These personnel would approach tions if they adapt different philosophical structures, training problems more like criminals and less like non-Western concepts, and other-nation military soldiers dressed as criminals. This takes time and methodologies for executing all training exercises? requires delicate, thoughtful approaches to trigger Can literate operators develop illiterate planning decentralized, adaptive behavior where the crimiprocesses to avoid simulacra and produce results nals have the freedom to innovate and act in ways that align with illiterate rivals in a conﬂict? If not, that soldiers tied to traditional military units would never consider.29 With training, the usually negative what is preventing this? I do not suggest our opposing forces become term “going native” inverts to a positive–we want criminals or convert to a radical ideology; however, our opposing forces to move away from how we they could implement many different processes that perform and think instead of thinking like Ameridemonstrate at a philosophical level a new military can soldiers in costume. This requires an iterative, training goal to abandon overt aspects of training innovative process to avoid the pitfalls of sliding simulacra in favor of improved simulation. Many back into training simulacra. Other soldiers role-playing a conventional nonactors in the entertainment industry spend months living with the person or environment to attain a Western force could adapt Chinese- or Iranian-style better understanding for theatric value, which illus- decision-making, command structures, and planning approaches instead of doing precisely what trates a similar principle. While opposing forces cannot join Al-Qaeda friendly forces do. Their “going native” would training camps, we can immerse them in the infor- differ from criminals or other rival actors, and the mation, motives, and values that generate enemy native aspects need to be genuine, not simulacra. thought processes and make precise adjustments to how our opposing forces train.28 We also can remove many of the non-Al-Qaeda processes out of their methodologies for the training event, which stimulates further critical thinking and reﬂection on our military institutions. For an Iranian modeled threat, we would tailor their methodologies and structure yet again. Each rival threat requirement necessitates a tailored, appropriate approach to avoid training simulacra. Army units need to train against threats that do not think the same. This U.S. Army soldiers of the 525th Battleﬁeld Surveillance Brigade and Ukrainian army soldiers fend stimulates our units to adapt, off role-playing rioters during a Kosovo force mission rehearsal exercise at the Joint Multinational innovate, and reﬂect. Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, 3 May 2013. (U.S. Army) 20 January-February 2014 MILITARY REVIEW

Military Review English Edition January-February 2014 | Page 22