Military Review English Edition January-February 2014 | Page 21

DO WE TRAIN TO FAIL?

A U.S. Army soldier of 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, replicating an enemy combatant, fires his M249G machine gun during a decisive
action training environment exercise, Saber Junction 2012, at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, 28 October
2012. (U.S. Army)

their actual decision making into something different
from the original.22
Terrorist elements with ideological motives are further divorced from our Western planning and control
methodologies, as their overarching worldviews offer
an incompatible position that is often categorized
by us as “illogical” or “crazy.” We base our sense of
logical and illogical on the position that our Western world view is the logical or sane one against all
others. The further away from our preferred perspective, the more apt we are to label something illogical
because it makes no sense when filtered through our
lens. However, there are other perspectives that build
foundations in non-Western logics.23
What are some other world views that differ
from the accepted Western one?24 Games theorist
Anatol Rapoport uses the term “divine messianic
eschatological” for explaining non-Western conflict
philosophies that disregard Carl Von Clausewitz
and his position that human societies function
MILITARY REVIEW

January-February 2014

through an endless cycle of politics and violence.25
To paraphrase Rapoport, “eschatological” reflects
a world view where a final, climactic battle occurs
with a predetermined outcome versus Clausewitz’s
theory where either opponent might win and there is
no “final” battle. Those with a “judgment day” ideology feature a divine or “God-chosen” position, with
“messianic” implying that the chosen army is already
here, fighting evil in a very non-Clausewitzian world.
Rapoport introduces several other non-Western
conflict theories, which might explain radical ecoterrorists, international and global conglomerates,
totalitarian regimes, and international criminal enterprises differently than Clausewitz. All of these rivals
feature prominently in the U.S. Army’s new “decisive action” hybrid enemy threat.26 Yet our decisive
action concept shackles all of these actors under the
preferred Western theory on conflict and motive.27
While one might argue that the wide spectrum of
rivals, whether conventional state armies, criminal
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