Middle East Media and Book Reviews Online Volume 1, Issue 1 | Page 54

2/2/2016

Middle East Media and Book Reviews Online

This book tells these two stories well and, although the book is filled with technical military jargon and acronyms that can bog down the average
reader, the book is a must read for those who want to know more about the military side of these two campaigns. Two of the authors are faculty
members at the National War College and this book will be, and should be, required reading for future military officers. This is a sad period in
American history—a period of great cost in lives and money, and a period in which the international reputation of the United States has been
greatly damaged.
However, despite the book’s strengths, a military history of war does not tell the entire story. By focusing on military decisions, tactics, and
personnel, much of the cultural and historical richness of these two wars is missing. This is particularly true of the Afghan front, where the authors
seem unaware of the ethnic, sectarian, regional, and tribal complexities of the country, and its history of foreign invasions. Taking the struggle to
form an Afghan National Army as an example, the authors focus on the difficulties of military and technical training. However, the real struggle to
recruit and train an Afghan National Army has been thwarted by the ethnic and tribal nature of Afghan society. To put it differently, you can’t
create a national army when the ethnic and tribal differences are stronger than national identity. Because of ethnic and tribal animosities,
Afghanistan cannot recruit, for example, Tajik soldiers and send them to the Pushtun areas, where the Taliban stronghold is.
In addition, the book presents an oversimplified picture of the Taliban, what their motivations are, and how they have evolved and changed since
9/11. Many of the insurgents in Afghanistan are not Taliban fighters at all, but belong to groups only loosely connected to the Taliban. These
groups include especially the Haqqani network, which is briefly noted in the book. But the role of the Haqqani network, which is closely connected
to the Pakistani military, in attacking the Kabul region is not discussed. The same could be said of the Hezb-e Islami insurgents of Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar. Both the Hezb-e Islami and the Haqqani insurgents pose a serious threat to the government in Kabul, but are not members of the
Taliban. Even in the so-called Taliban areas in Kandahar and Helmond provinces, many of the insurgents are local farmers concerned with local
issues and only loosely connect to the Taliban leaders in Quetta.
By focusing on military aspects of these two conflicts, the authors do not present a good picture of who the Iraqi or the Afghan people actually are
and how they think. The military term COIN, counter insurgency, is often used to indicate a military strategy that takes into account the welfare and
concerns of the local citizens, but in fact much of the opposition that arose to the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq came from average citizens
who opposed the occupation of their countries by foreign troops. This opposition is not ideological—the citizens of these countries just resent the
presents of tens of thousands of troops in their country.
Finally, it is not clear that the book’s basic point that U.S. lost the war in Afghanistan because it was also fighting a war in Iraq is true. In fact, the
U.S. lost the war in Afghanistan for multiple reasons, many of them not related to military decisions. Although the U.S. met its original goals in
Afghanistan, it long overstayed its welcome, supports a corrupt and ineffective government in Afghanistan, and has long since lost the support of
the Afghan people by becoming an occupier instead of a liberator. The question now is how to get out.
In summary, this is a well-research and well-written book on the Afghan and Iraqi wars. Written from a military perspective, the book covers most
of the important military decisions regarding the strategies and tactics of these two wars. Yet, unlike some military historians, the authors are
realistic about the ultimate outcomes of these two conflicts and the mistakes made in them. The book is a must read for those who are interested in
understanding these two conflicts.

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