McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014 April, 2014 | Page 98

the clergy as a social group in the country21.
In passing his agricultural reforms,
Marcos surely knew that a significant
number of Filipino farmers would become
unemployed. The introduction of chemical
farming eliminated the need for thousands
of workers. Even if industrial jobs were
becoming rapidly available, which they
were not22, the laid off farmers would have
required significant training in order to
transfer industries. Marcos could have
developed an assistance program or provided
state subsidized employment retraining for
the jobless farmers in order to maintain
a high level of loyalty from the very poor.
Alternatively, when the agrarian subordinate
class increasingly turned to protest, he could
have dedicated more resources to repressing
dissidence. He did neither, instead choosing
to maintain a high level of personal
consumption.
Comparatively, Kim’s economic policies
prevented the development of a bourgeoisie,
a group that typically provides important
leadership during revolution. Kim used the
resources he seized from the possessing class
to his political advantage. By redistributing
these resources among the his supporters23,
the North Korean leader was able to
consolidate the support and loyalty of the
political elite. By maintaining an extremely
high level of repression, Kim ensured that
there were no significant protests launched
by the groups he had marginalized. Instead
of maximizing his personal consumption,
Kim kept his supporters loyal and preserved
a consistent level of repression.
As a result of Marcos’ economic
policies, the agrarian subordinate class in
the Philippines was no longer willing to
acquiesce. Since Marcos had lost their loyalty
Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, “Pyongyang’s
Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in
North Korea,” International Security 35.1 (2010): 49.
22
Benedict J. Kerkvliet, “Land Reform in the
Philippines since the Marcos Coup,” Public Affairs
47.3 (1974): 290.
23
Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, “North Korea:
The Hardest Nut,” Foreign Policy 139 (2003): 46.
21

98 | McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014

and he did not significantly increase his level
of repression, the group increasingly engaged
in protest24. This in turn, caused soft-liners
within the Marcos regime to begin doubting
that the perpetuation of authoritarian rule
was viable. The intensity and frequency of
protest activity caused this group to believe
that the regime would inevitably fall. In
order to protect their political standing,
this important faction began supporting
calls for liberalization and became more
open to creating pacts with the subordinate
class. Marcos’ economic policy increased the
likelihood that democratization could take
hold in the country.

“While both leaders attempted
to solidify their rule through
personalization of the military,
Marcos was far less successful
than Kim.”

In North Korea, Kim’s economic policy
did the exact opposite. By redistributing
wealth to political elites, Kim was able to
consolidate his authoritarian rule in three
ways. First, he reinforced hard-liners’ belief
that the continuation of the regime was
feasible. Second, he was able to convert
some soft-liners into hard-liners. Third, he
was able to appease soft-liners that believed
some form of democratization was the
necessary outcome of authoritarianism.
Kim’s effectiveness in minimizing protest
activity gave soft-liners reason to believe that
liberalization was unnecessary at that current
juncture. Unlike his Filipino counterpart,
Kim’s strategic choices regarding economic
policy helped to consolidate his rule.
Alternative theories explaining regime
trajectory suggest that prospects for
democratization are shaped by the relative
power balance between different classes. As
evidenced by the aforementioned discussion
of economic policy however, the relative
Benedict J. Kerkvliet, “Land Reform in the
Philippines since the Marcos Coup,” Public Affairs
47.3 (1974): 293.
24

balance of power between classes can be
explained as a product of elite decisionmaking. In the Philippines, Marcos further
marginalized the very poor. In North
Korea, Kim bolstered the political elite, at
the expense of the possessing class and the
clergy. The relative balance between different
classes and the effect that has on regime
consolidation, can best be understood by
looking at strategic choices made by elites.
Marcos and Kim both attempted to
prevent divisions from emerging within
the elite in their states. The Marcos regime
was unable to prevent a number of divisions
among elites from developing by the early
1980s. There were two significant elite
divisions in the Philippines. First, a division
emerged between “crony” and “non-crony”
segments of the business class. The “cronies,”
were the new economic eli H