McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014 April, 2014 | Page 70

coup in 1977 and acquired the title Chief
of Martial Law Administrator. He was a
practicing Muslim who wanted to bring
the legal, social, economic, educational
and political institutions of the country in
conformity with Islamic principles, values
and traditions in the light of Quran and
Sunnah, in order to enable the people of
Pakistan to lead their lives in accordance
with Islam. Zia ul-Haq’s own interpretation
of Islam was deeply conservative and
his legacy includes heightened sectarian
identities which gave rise to militant
organizations, the enforcement of the Sharia
in accordance to state law, and the question
of which interpretation of Islam should be
the basis for government policy.
One of the biggest ramifications of Zia’s
imposition of Islamic law in accordance with
Sunni teachings was the public dissent of
the minority Shiite population of Pakistan.
The Shiites were already feeling threatened
as a minority in the nation because they
had witnessed the Ahmeddiyah minority
branded as non-Muslim; they discovered a
sectarian identity by perceiving an existence
of threat42 and felt that they would be
prosecuted on the basis of their religious
identity. This caused a stir amongst the Shiite
community which led to the beginning of
Shiite political mobilization in Pakistan.
They saw their beliefs being marginalized
and Sunni teachings as being forced upon
them. This led to the emergence of religious
organizations for both sects: the Sunni
establishment of Sipah-i Sahabi founded
by Haqq Nawaz Jhangawi in 1985, and the
Shiite establishment of Tahrik-i Jaffariya
Pakistan founded by Mufti Jafar Husayn
in 198043. The Iranian Revolution of 1979
further dampened the sectarian situation in
Pakistan, whereby the Sunnis felt threatened
by a possible Shiite uprising, which
resulted in more clashes between the two
Qasim Zaman, “Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi’i and Sunni Identities,” Modern Asian
Studies, vol. 32 (1998): 693.
43
Ibid., 697.
42

70 | McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014

sects. Hashmi’s theory of the relationship
between threat and mobilisation reflects the
situation that occurred during this time in
Pakistan: “The common thread that weaves
violent political movements together is fear.
This is true in the case of violent religious
movements. The fear of being deprived of
something drives one to act aggressively,
while the fear of being left out drive
movements against prevalent forces44.” There
was violence from both sides; shops were
burnt, religious institutions were destroyed,
leading figures from both religious parties
were assassinated and there were mass
protests and demonstrations, which go on to
this very day45. Sectarian violence continues
to cause hundreds of deaths in the country
each year.
The Shiites are not the only minority
in Pakistan who were affected by the
Islamization in the country. The other
religious minorities that make up less
than five percent of the population were
concerned about their safety and their
recognition as Pakistani nationals even
though they were not followers of the
Muslim faith. With the implementation
of the blasphemy laws (prosecution on the
grounds of blasphemy against the Quran
or the Sunnah) by Zia ul-Haq in the late
1970s, hundreds of Christians, Sikhs, and
other religious minorities have experienced
persecution and discrimination the grounds
of religion; such laws, on the one hand,
“discriminate against religious minorities
and, on the other hand, further deepen
religious intolerance and fanaticism in
Pakistani society.” Even “repealing the law
is currently an out-of-question option for
the president or the parliament given the
expanded influence of militant Islam in
today’s Pakistan46.”
Saleem Hashmi, “Pakistan: Politics, Religion and
Extremism,” (May, 2009): 7.
45
Rais, “Identity Politics and Minorities,” 122.
46
Siraj Akbar, “Who Benefits from Pakistan’s Blasphemy Law?” The Huffington Post, August 23, 2012. Accessed at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/malik-siraj-akbar/pakistans-blasphemy-law-c_b_1820601.html.
44

Instead of the unity that religion was
supposed to foster, the political use of Islam
has instead propagated extremism and
sectarian violence. One has to understand
that religion is not homogeneously
interpreted and once unification is attempted
through religion, this fact becomes a chief
obstacle to deciding which interpretation
of the religion in question is the most
appropriate. In the case of Pakistan, multiple
interpretations of Islam were being put forth
simultaneously, resulting in sectarian rift.
Moreover, the issue has further intensified
religious bigotry against minorities. In the
recent past, there have been attacks against
Sufi shrines, as well as against Shiites,
Ahmeddiyahs and Christians. Moreover,
draconian laws continue to be in place, the
repealing of which would lead to an increase
of violence due to resistance on behalf
of the religious clergy, a group that has
become extremely powerful through their
active promotion by the state in past years.
However, a forced Islamic identity poses a
deeper problem. It is impossible to agree on
what it precisely means to be Muslim, let
alone how to implement the mechanics of
an Islamic state in modern times. Sadly, that
has not stopped successive Pakistani leaders
from mobilising Islam as the signal marker
of citizenship time and again.
The strategic use of political Islam to
tac