McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014 April, 2014 | Page 58

emphasizing the import of the American
security umbrella frequently consider the
primacy of realist frameworks and contend
that, if the US retreated from its security
commitments, Japan would compensate by
pursuing rearmament.
Those states expressing concern over
the Japanese rearmament cite evidence
of several of its political developments,
including increased defense spending, the
pursuit of nuclear deterrence strategies, and
nationalistic discourse from politicians35. In
fact, the US has been instrumental in the
postwar reconstruction of Japan’s military,
particularly under the 1952 Mutual Security
Agreement which “[has] allowed the United
States to supply military equipment and
training to the growing Japanese military
through the Mutual Security Program36.”
Miller notes further that, “Since the end
of the US occupation of Japan in 1952, the
United States had sought to incorporate
Japan into [the Mutual Security Program],
rebuilding a Japanese military that only
seven years before it had sought to destroy
completely37.” Recently, the transformation
of American defense policy under the Bush
administration required Japan, as party
to the Mutual Security Treaty, to take a
more active role in regional security38. This
development supports Kang’s claims that
Japan has had various reasons to doubt
American commitment to its defense and
further contributes to the viability of its
militarization strategy39.
One percent of Japan’s Gross National
Product (GNP) is spent on the military40.
In accordance with the postclassical realist
framework, Japanese foreign policymaking
Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New
Analytical Frameworks,” 75.
36
Ibid., 77.
37
Miller, “The Struggle to Rearm Japan: Negotiating
the Cold War State in Us-Japanese Relations,” 83.
38
Shuichi, “Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution
and Security Policy: Realism Versus Idealism in Japan
since the Second World War,” 425.
39
Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New
Analytical Frameworks,” 77.
40
Ibid., 78.
35

58 | McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014

is sensitive to the economic costs of defense
and will seek to maximize its security without
incurring a security dilemma. Japan—the
world’s third largest economy—currently
spends around one percent of its GNP on
defense, amounting to $24.04 billion41.
This spending is considerably smaller than
comparable figures from similar countries,
such as Germany and France, which invest
1.3 and 2.3, respectively, in the most recent
data42. Thus, militarization is still possible
at the acceptable rate of one percent of its
GNP avoiding a regional security dilemma
while still maintaining concern over its
economic resources like an archetypal
within the postclassical realist framework.
J