McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014 April, 2014 | Page 56

further, and threaten a security dilemma
within the region. Regularly launching
threats against the Japanese islands, North
Korea’s totalitarian government harbors
animosity towards Japan largely as a result
of its role in the Korean War, wherein Japan
served as the central mobilization point for
the US military and benefited enormously
in terms of American procurement contracts
and other externalities22.
Further exacerbating tensions between
Japan and North Korea, the former’s
Maritime Safety Agency forcefully engaged
a North Korean vessel (unidentified at the
time) as it resisted a procedural boarding by
the Japanese ship23. Japanese foreign policy
undoubtedly makes real considerations of
the threat posed by North Korea, as the
rogue state possesses nuclear weapons and
harbors longstanding resentment towards
the Japan. So, an important factor in Japan’s
steady rearmament can be derived from
political instability in Northeast Asia.
Furthermore, the extent to which Japanese
foreign policymakers fear a North Korean
attack is consistent with the postclassical
realist view that states will act in preparation
of probable conflicts.
Similar to the case of North Korea,
atrocities committed by the Japanese army
during its occupation of China contribute
to latent animosity there. Contrasting
with North Korea, however, China’s threat
against Japan is more economically-based
than militarily. Furthermore, Japan’s role as
the largest economy in Asia is quickly being
upset by China’s rise, thus creating instability
in that Japanese policy calculations based
on the regional economic primacy appear
increasingly challenged.
Japanese foreign policy has conceived
of peace and security as being a function
of trade, but students of postclassical
realism would likely argue that Japan
Miller, “The Struggle to Rearm Japan: Negotiating
the Cold War State in Us-Japanese Relations,” 87.
23
Inoguchi, “Japan as a Global Ordinary Power: Its
Current Phase,” 8.
22

56 | McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014

may militarize if Chinese firms continue
to undercut their domestic counterparts,
eventually supplanting its trade with the
US. Postclassical realism regards rational
states as those which ultimately “[seek]
to increase the economic resources under
their control . . . subject to the constraint of
providing for short-term military security24.”
Recent developments in Japanese foreign
policy display that it has not only been
more active in terms of attaining greater
security independence, but has also moved
to disassociate itself from any potential
conflict over Taiwan25. Such has had the
effect of straining its relations with the US,
as this lack of commitment to Taiwan can
be perceived as an appeasement to China26.
Surprisingly, however, China has indicated
that Japan’s alliance with the United States
is more preferable than an independent
Japan with much more powerful military
capabilities27. Ultimately, and in accordance
with the theoretical work of Kenneth Waltz,
Japan might reasonably be expected to
expand its military capabilities under the
guise of mitigating uncertainties stemming
from the anarchic nature of the international
system28.
Like the potential flashpoint that Japan
faces in the case of Taiwan, its territorial
dispute with China and the Philippines
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the
South China Sea further threatens regional
security29. As China’s economic clout
increasingly grows, Japanese policymakers
Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese
Security Policy,” 228.
25
Ibid.
26
Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New
Analytical Frameworks,” 228.; To be sure, Japan would
prefer the avoidance of any conflict altogether. Taiwan,
however, constitutes an important strategic consideration, particularly for the US, and the expectation is
that Japan would contribute to its defense in the event
of conflict.
27
Inoguchi, “Japan as a Global Ordinary Power: Its
Current Phase,” 7.
28
Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese
Security Policy,” 226.
29
““Japan Will Stand up to China, Says Pm Shinzo
Abe,” BBC News, October 26 2013.
24

undoubtedly harbor apprehensions that
such territorial disputes may be used as a
pretext for war. This perception generates a
sense of insecurity about Japan’s own status
in the global order of powerful states, and
permits militarism and rearmament to be
increasingly considered as viable measures
to counteract China’s rise.
Following the end of the Second World
War, the US has proven to be Japan’s
most important ally, both militarily and
economically. Not only do the two nations
profit enormously from trade and commerce
among themselves, but Japan has relied
on the American security umbrella for
its defense sinc