McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014 April, 2014 | Page 52

Abstract
Japan’s post-WWII constitution contains a clause titled Article 9, which renounces the
use of war to solve international disputes. However, current rhetoric expressed by Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe articulates attitudes favouring the rearmament of Japan’s security
forces. This paper contends that the militarist movement in Japan is the result of its decades-long stagnant economy, security issues with neighbouring China and North Korea,
its military and economic ties with the United States, and various formative periods of
military governance. By employing the framework of postclassical realism, these factors
can help explain Japan’s rearmament behavior.

T

The Militarization of
Japan as a Postclassical
Realist Strategy
By Karlene Ooto-Stubbs

he formation of Japanese foreign
policy has changed profoundly
over the course of the past century,
resulting in unique patterns of its interstate
interactions. The early decades of the
twentieth century coincided with the
prosecution of an extraordinarily aggressive
foreign policy by successive governments
in Japan; ones that are associated with
a series of terrible wars and infamous
occupations across East and Southeast
Asia. This pattern of bellicosely revisionist
foreign policy culminated in Japan’s defeat
at the end of the Second World War,
after which the government and political
sphere was expunged of all militaristic
tendencies and the island nation entered
into a long and uninterrupted peace which
persists to this day. Recently, however,
rearmament has become a salient issue in
Japan’s domestic political discourse, and
its foreign policy appears increasingly to
shy away from defensive approaches to
perceived foreign threats, instead favoring
more active responses—even if they carry
the risk of confrontation with regional
competitors1. Article 9 of the Constitution
of Japan famously renounces the right of its
government to wage war—a legal measure
operationalized through limitations imposed
on the size of military forces and the virtual
elimination of offensive capabilities2.
Stephen G Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” International
Organization 51, no. 3 (1997): 446.
2
Wada Shuichi, “Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution and Security Policy: Realism Versus Idealism in
1

Keywords: Japan, Foreign Policy, Post-Classical Realism, Article 9, Rearmament

However, the current rhetoric articulated
by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expresses
determination to dramatically alter the
postwar institutionalization of Japan’s pacifist
foreign policy. This resurgent militarism and
the rearmament dialogue are the result of
Japan’s chronic economic stagnation, latent
security concerns emanating from China
and North Korea, shifting military and
economic ties with the United States (US),
and the reanimation of prior formative
periods of military governance within public
consciousness. This paper contends that the
aforementioned factors, as they account
for contemporary shifts in Japan’s foreign
policymaking, are best understood within
the framework of postclassical realism3.
Recent Japanese foreign policy has
placed heavy emphasis on economic
performance and technological prowess4.
Indicative of this was Japan’s attainment of
the position of second largest economy in
the world during the 1980’s5. Observing this
phenomenon, scholar Tsuyoshi Kawasaki
comments that, “unlike defensive realism,
postclassical realism explicitly incorporates
the question of economic power in addition
to that of the security dilemma6.” Cognizant
Japan since the Second World War” (paper presented
at the Japan Forum, 2010), 408.
3
Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” 445-46.
4
Unless indicated otherwise, “Japanese foreign policy”
will heretofore refer to its general manifestation and
patterns in the postwar era.
5
Takashi Inoguchi, “Japan as a Global Ordinary Power: Its Current Phase,” CJST 28, no. 1 (2008): 5.
6
Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and
The Militarization of Japan | Ooto-Stubbs | 53