McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014 April, 2014 | Page 100

Marcos vested extraordinary power in the
hands of a few individuals. The military
personnel who were appointed to fill these
positions all had ties to Marcos and his inner
circle.33 The strong evidence suggesting
nepotism was at play resulted in some highranking military officers calling Marcos’
leadership into question. This sentiment, in
combination with a strong legacy of military
independence in the Philippines34, led to
backlash against Marcos’ personalization
of the military. Marcos’ military strategy
further indicates the leader’s willingness
to sacrifice loyalty to increase his level of
personal consumption. Although military
defections became increasingly common,
Marcos made the strategic calculation to
preference personal consumption over
heightened repression.
Unlike Marcos, Kim sacrificed his
personal consumption to cast a wider net
when overpaying economic elites. Members
of the “core” class included descendants
of anti-Japanese guerrillas, heroes of the
Korean War, and party bureaucrats35. By
bribing a greater number and a more diverse
selection of elites, Kim was able to ensure
a high level of loyalty in North Korea.
In the Filipino context, individuals felt
marginalized because they were excluded
from economic advantages as a result of the
Marcos’ nepotistic policies. Comparatively,
excluded individuals in North Korea were
better able to reconcile their omission
from the “core” class because Kim had
given preference to national heroes. This
meant that individuals in the “wavering”
and “hostile36” classes were less likely to
demonstrate in opposition to the regime.
Ibid., 45.
Albert F. Celoza, Ferdinand Marcos and
the Philippines: The Political Economy of
Authoritarianism (Westport: Praeger Publishers,
1997), 82.
35
Marcus Noland, “Transition from the Bottom-Up:
Institutional Change in North Korea,” Comparative
Economic Studies 48 (2006): 195.
36
Changyong Choi, “‘Everyday Politics’ in North
Korea,” The Journal of Asian Studies 72.3 (2013):
664.
33
34

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Kim Il Sung made public dissidence further
improbable by continuing to sacrifice his
personal consumption to maintain a high
level of repression.
The North Korean dictator was also
quite successful at cultivating unification
among military elites. Instead of focusing on
integrating military and civilian elites like
Marcos, Kim directed his attention toward
bestowing prestige upon the military. Kim
developed an active arms industry, created a
national holiday honouring the military, and
regularly praised the troops in his public
addresses37. The elite appreciated their
newfound prominence [