PERSONAL INJURY CORNER
Standard for Summary Judgment Changes
TED BABBITT
Anyone who has handled both Florida State cases and Federal cases , knows that in state courts summary judgments are rarer than hen ’ s teeth , while in federal court summary judgment is a way of life .
There is virtually no difference between the wording of Florida Rule 1.510 ( c ) and Federal Rule 56 ( a ) but the interpretation of the standards set forth in those rules are worlds apart in Federal vs . State court .
On December 31 , 2020 the Supreme Court of Florida , on its own motion , adopted the summary judgment standard applied in Federal Court , adopting the interpretation of the United State Supreme Court in the cases of Celotex Corp . v . Catrett , 477 U . S . 317 ( 1986 ); Anderson v . Liberty Lobby , Inc . 477 U . S . 242 ( 1986 ); and Matsushita Electrical Industrial , Co . v . Zenith Radio , Corp ., 475 U . S . 574 ( 1986 ).
Florida Courts have consistently required that the moving party in a summary judgment must conclusively disprove the non-movants theory of a case in order to eliminate every issue of fact . To understand the difference between the Florida and Federal standard one has to review the above three cited U . S . Supreme Court cases .
In Celotex , supra . the U . S . Supreme Court articulated a standard foreign to that consistently adopted by Florida Courts . At 322-323 the Celotex court held the following :
( a ) The plain language of Rule 56 ( c ) mandates the entry of summary judgment , after adequate time for discovery and upon motion , against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party ’ s case , and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . In such a situation , there can be “ no genuine issue as to any material fact ,” since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party ’ s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial . The moving party is “ entitled to a judgment as a matter of law ” because the nonmoving party ( 477 . U . S . 317 , 318 ) has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element
of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof . P . 322-232 /
( b ) There is no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent ’ s claim . On the contrary , Rule 56 ( c ), which refers to the affidavits , “ if any ,” suggest the absence of such a requirement , and Rules 56 ( a ) and ( b ) provide that claimants and defending parties may move for summary judgment “ with or without supporting affidavits .” Rule 56 ( e ), which relates to the form and use of affidavits and other materials does not require that the moving party ’ s motion always be supported by affidavits to show initially the absence of a genuine issue for trial . Adickes v . S . H . Kress & Co ., supra , explained Pp . 323-326 .
The above holding in Celotex stands on its head the idea that the moving party has the burden of going forward and eliminating all issues of fact . To the contrary , under the Federal standard the nonmoving party has the burden of establishing essential elements of its case and there is no requirement for the moving party to support the motion with its own factual proof .
In Anderson , supra . the nonmovants burden of establishing a material fact is far greater than the Florida standard . At 247 the Anderson court holds :
“ a summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is “ genuine ” that is , if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party . At the summary judgement stage , the trial judges function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter , but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial . There is no such issue unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party . In essence , the inquiry is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury , or whether it is so one sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law .”
The Florida Supreme Court in adopting the Federal procedure cites Matsushita , supra . for the proposition that “ A party opposing summary judgment must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .” In fact , Matsushita seems to require even more persuasion on the part of the nonmovant . At 585 the Matsushita court holds
( c ) To survive Petitioners ’ motion for summary judgment , respondents must establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioners entered into an illegal conspiracy that caused respondents to suffer cognizable injury . If the factual context renders respondents ’ claims implausible , i . e ., claims that make no economic sense , respondents must offer more persuasive evidence to support their claims than would otherwise be necessary . To survive a motion for a summary judgment , a plaintiff seeking damages for violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act must present evidence “ that tends to exclude the possibility ” that the alleged conspirators acted independently . Thus , respondents here must show that the inference of a conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that could not have harmed respondents . Pp . 475 U . S . 585-588 .
The adoption of the Federal standard brings Florida in line with 38 other states which have adopted that standard . While the Florida Supreme Court did not change any of the wording of Florida Rule 1.510 ( c ), the change in interpretation and the application of the summary judgment rule is completely changed to allow far greater latitude on the part of the trial judge in granting a summary judgment .
PBCBA BAR BULLETIN 17