W
e would like to believe that
Kenya became a democratic
republic after gaining freedom
from colonial rule. However the type of
democracy that we adopted was truly
strange and it is difficult to try to figure
out what our particular type of democracy
was intended to achieve.
We can only assume that it was an oversight
in the drafting of the independence
constitution that allowed the executive to
pick cabinet from the elected members of
parliament. In fact the president himself
was an elected member of parliament.
That meant that to be a member of
the executive you had to first seek the
mandate of your constituency, and if one
was subsequently ‘elevated’ and became
a cabinet member, one automatically
became a super MP.
In fact, ‘flying the flag’, as being appointed
to the cabinet was referred to then became
such a coveted position and an indication
of the relative power that one wielded
in the government dependent on which
portfolio one was allocated.
To add confusion to this democratic
mchuxi mix the president also appointed
the chief justice, in effect he had his man
in the judiciary. We are at pains to fathom
what type of separation of powers could
be achieved by such an arrangement.
The Kenyan constitution right from
inception created an imperial president
and since this was a democratic model
which our colonial masters had helped to
craft we wonder if we were not being set
up for failure.
The obvious effect of our type of
democracy was that the principle of
checks and balances which is the bedrock
of democracy was compromised from the
beginning and as the adage goes, power
corrupts and absolute power corrupts
absolutely.
The latter calls by rebel politicians for
a second liberation were as a result of a
poorly crafted constitution that simply
removed the yoke of the colonialist and
substituted it with the yoke of Kenyan
dictators who were also the commanders
in chief of the armed forces.
Note that when a member of parliament
was elevated into the cabinet, his
constituency and it was usually a ‘he’, was
left without a representative in parliament,
when they assumed their executive duties.
This included the president’s constituency.
The appointment of the cabinet
from members of parliament was to
inadvertently prove to be the single most
unfortunate decision in the constitution
because it set in motion unforeseen
consequences that still reverberate in our
country.
By a quirk of fate, the first lot of politicians
in Kenya happened to have been mainly
teachers who were able to converse with
the colonialists having gone to school
and as they were the ones explaining the
independence process to the wananchi,
they got elected.
To run a ministry, which is what cabinet
ministers are supposed to, requires
administrative skills but to be voted into
parliament requires mobilization ability.
Soon the popular leader in a constituency
edged out the ‘learned’ leader.
At independence when there were
only fifteen ministries and not many
Kenyans qualified enough to be given the
responsibility of running a country, the
cabinet was mainly an old boys club with
nine of the fifteen having been Alliance
High School alumni.
It was possible for this team of friends to
sit down and craft a decent plan for the
sake of the country because they were
like-minded and all wanted to be rid of
the colonialist who had created a glass
ceiling for them.
Things got murkier later as it became
necessary to balance political interests in
the hope of trying to achieve a national
face in the cabinet. The seeds of corruption
were already sown as political expediency
became more important than national
needs.
Having to choose his cabinet from the
elected members of parliament meant that
the president had a limited pool of talent
to pick from. In effect a cabinet position
became a political reward for loyalty and
not effectiveness.
Since Kenya ended up being a de facto one
party state, a cabinet position became a
coveted one because it sent a signal as one
of those favored by the president and also
ensured the electability of the politician
as he was deemed to have the ear of the
president.
At independence you had a hotchpotch of
ministers with interesting qualifications,
doctors as foreign ministers, social
scientists as trade ministers and teachers
in practically all the other ministries. Only
Bruce Mackenzie seemed to occupy a
position he had competence in.
By competence we actually mean that he
had experience in agriculture having been
among the South African settlers that
were being encouraged to occupy Kenya
by the likes of Ewert Grogan and Lord
Delamere with a view to declare a white
state in Kenya.
This trend of appointing people into
positions of power with no accountability
since competence for the job was not
required meant that the president was
picking the ‘best’ from a very limited pool
of populists.
To further prove our collective naivety we
assumed that independence gave us natural
ability in public administration and in
order to have a better grip of the country
provincial commissioners appointed by
the president assumed regional governor’s
status.
This would not have been so damaging if
the president, who had absolute power, had
not interfered with the public service and
politicized the appointment of permanent
secretaries who were supposed to be the
chief executives of the ministries.
We have argued in the past that we are led
by thugs because professionals in the private
sector shun politics and we end up electing
societal dregs but it seems it is virtually im-
possible for private sector professionals to
transition into public service and remain
professional.