Navigating DOJ’ s New Corporate Enforcement Landscape: Key Considerations for Environmental Voluntary Self-Disclosures
GREGORY F. LINSIN Senior Counsel
HOLLI B. PACKER Associate
The Department of Justice(“ DOJ” or the“ Department”) released its new Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy(“ CEP”) on March 10, 2026, establishing, for the first time, a single, comprehensive framework governing all corporate criminal matters handled by the Department, with the exception of antitrust offenses. While the CEP shares similarities with prior division-specific DOJ policies, a comparison to the previous Environmental Crimes Section’ s Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy(“ ECS Policy”) reveals notable differences that maritime industry personnel should understand. As this policy landscape continues to evolve, stakeholders will need to monitor how these differences play out in practice before drawing conclusions about the new policy’ s practical impact.
Background Both the DOJ’ s new CEP and the prior ECS Policy attempt to encourage responsible corporate behavior by providing incentives for companies to voluntarily self-disclose misconduct, cooperate with investigations, and remediate wrongdoing. The prior ECS Policy, drafted in accordance with the Deputy Attorney General’ s September 2022 memorandum regarding corporate criminal enforcement policies, focused specifically on environmental criminal matters and the concerns they implicate, including protection of the environment, public health, worker safety, wildlife, and natural resources. The new CEP, by contrast, supersedes all division-specific policies and applies broadly to all corporate criminal matters handled by the Department, with the exception of antitrust violations under 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-38.
Objectives and Three-Part Framework— Elements of the New CEP The CEP is designed to accomplish six primary goals:( 1) drive early, voluntary self-disclosure of criminal conduct;
( 2) promote timely and effective enforcement of criminal laws, including holding culpable individuals accountable;( 3) reduce harm;( 4) facilitate prompt remedial action, including requiring companies to compensate victims and address corporate deficiencies;( 5) help ensure consistency across the Department; and( 6) transparently describe the Department’ s policies and decision-making. These goals are intended to be met through a structured, tiered framework, based on each company’ s conduct and cooperation.
Part I: Declination. Under the most favorable pathway, prosecutors will decline to prosecute a company that voluntarily self-discloses misconduct to an appropriate DOJ criminal component, fully cooperates with the investigation, timely remediates, and presents no aggravating circumstances related to the nature, seriousness, egregiousness, or pervasiveness of the misconduct. Even where aggravating circumstances exist, prosecutors have discretion to recommend a declination after weighing the severity of those circumstances against the company’ s self-disclosure, cooperation, and remediation efforts. All declinations under the CEP will be made public.
Part II:“ Near Miss” Voluntary Self-Disclosures. For companies that fully cooperate and remediate, but are determined to be ineligible for full declination because the disclosure did not qualify as a voluntary disclosure and / or there were aggravating factors that warranted criminal resolution, the Department shall provide a Non-Prosecution Agreement(“ NPA”) 1 in cases where particularly egregious circumstances are absent. Prosecutors shall allow a term length for the NPA of fewer than three years, shall not require an independent compliance monitor, and shall provide a fine reduction of at least 50 percent but not more than 75 percent off the low end of the U. S. Sentencing Guidelines range.
Part III: Other Resolutions. For companies that do not qualify under Parts I or II, prosecutors maintain discretion to determine the appropriate resolution, including form, term length, compliance obligations, and monetary penalty. Yet, the company will not receive, nor will the Department recommend to the sentencing court, a reduction of more than 50 percent off the fine under the Sentencing Guidelines. Although prosecutors will still have discretion to determine the specific percentage of reduction, a presumption exists that any reduction will be taken from the low-end of the range for companies that fully cooperate and remediate.
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