investment in skill were also significant adoption inhibitors. It is interesting to note that the impact of adopting conservation practices on profits were never identified as barrier to adoption. Despite this, once off payments rather than payments for ecosystem services were suggested to encourage adoption. Greiner et al.( 2009) found that graziers with lifestyle and conservation motivations had the greatest adoption of conservation practices whilst those motivated by economic / financial and social goals tended to be looking for external government assistance such as government incentives and extension to assist in the adoption of conservation practices.
Greiner et al.( 2009) focused on the impact of risk, defined as measurable and immeasurable uncertainty, on adoption. They noted that landholders who saw themselves as risk takers with respect to new grazing practices had a higher rate of adoption of rotational grazing, adjustment of stock to pasture condition and early destocking for drought. Managing grass cover was seen to be the best option for managing risk. On the theme of risk, Greiner and Gregg( 2011) found that landholders wishing to maintain their resource base were more likely to identify interest rates and debt payments as a risk and inhibitor to adoption. Greiner and Lankester( 2007) highlight that farm debt is an indirect driver of intensification requiring graziers to generate sufficient income to cover interest payments and principal repayments through good and bad years. The need for fixed payments can prevent early and adequate de-stocking in drought years and motivates short term maximization of production. This raises questions about the use of relationship with banks as a potential in the mix of incentive schemes to consider( see discussion on debt for conservation swap).
A study by Herr et al.( 2004) provides some additional insights into Burdekin landholder motivation for conservation adoption. These authors categorise impediments to motivation into 3 categories: 1) uncertainty; 2) information gaps; and 3) financial constraints. Herr et al.( 2004) also found that increases in equity in a property had a negative influence on paddock spelling and riparian vegetation management and that landholders were less likely to spell paddocks if they owned rather than managed the property, had a family successor or had leasehold title. Insufficient labour resources and variable climate conditions were significant impediments to conservation practices in general. These plus uncertainty about tenure, uncertainty about the industry, loss of productive capacity on property, lack of broader community support and insufficient information about optimal management practices were impediments to adoption more generally. Landholders surveyed in this study rated financial incentives( especially tax incentives) as the most effective adoption assistance mechanism. Other suggestions for adoption assistance included cost sharing approaches and the conversion of tenure from leasehold to freehold and rate / lease reduction for conservation. More specifically, those who rated variable climate conditions as a strong impediment rated conversion from leasehold to freehold tenure as an effective policy for conservation. Those that rated lack of community support as an impediment rated income tax incentives as an effective policy. It must be noted, however, that income tax incentives only apply in years of high income( they are also not targeted to areas of high conservation value). Accordingly, it is argued that income tax incentives could be more effective if supplemented with other mechanisms such as tradable resource use permits and assurance bonds. Finally, those who did not see lack of community support as a problem rated debt for conservation swaps as highly effective.
Whitten et al.( 2013) and Greiner( 2015) focus on the impact of contract design on uptake or conservation schemes. In these studies, it is noted that contract features such as the duration of
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