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SPRING 2021 that can sustain an advance and , 360 defence ( to physical and virtual threats ) in perpetuity . Therefore , we need to broaden our geographic concept of Deep , Close and Rear . The terminology remains a useful delineation of responsibilities but needs to account for a new sense of scale and direction . Our belief , here in ARRC , is that our enduring function as a Corps Headquarters is to enable the synthesis of multi-domain capability in the Land environment across time , space and function , the specifics of which will adapt in line with emerging technology .
Spanning the spectrum It is also clear that land forces must offer utility across the spectrum of competition , through crisis , and into conflict . In the NATO vernacular , they must make as much a contribution to deterrence as they do to the functions of defence . This being a relationship between the hard capabilities of physical manoeuvre at war and , through their latent threat , their utility in cognitive manoeuvre during crisis – i . e .: the power to compel . As David Kilcullen sets out in his 2020 book The Dragons and the Snakes , we face a form of competition that involves clandestine , covert and ambiguous activity below the jus ad bellum threshold of attribution ; a ‘ liminal model ’ designed to deliver fait accompli operations in advance of our collective ability to both detect and respond , thereby transferring the responsibility to re-escalation onto the shoulders of the Alliance . Addressing this issue will demand of us the ability to support an insight-based approach to deterrence – identifying indicators and warnings below the current thresholds of attribution – with the agility to respond , as a land force , in order to deter .
Opportunity to adapt These are exciting times for the land domain . Addressing the tactical complexity of contemporary warfare is also an invitation , if not an opportunity , to adapt . ARRC ’ s approach to these issues is to place a premium on experimentation through 2022 , adopting a methodology of trial , adapt , inculcate , improve . Through collaboration across the NATO force structure we assess that we can make some significant steps forward under the ‘ fight tonight ’ agenda – perhaps not the full panacea of tomorrow ’ s technology , but a decent march along that bearing and one that enhances our readiness for today ’ s challenges .
We are incredibly well-equipped within the Alliance to face down these challenges . Amongst its many virtues NATO is also an unrivalled knowledge-exchange . Even at the tactical level , we bare daily witness in ARRC to the benefits of multinationalism given the breadth of perspective across a diverse corps headquarters . So too in our relationships with our sister Corps across NATO , all of whom have directly or indirectly contributed towards our path to readiness as the Warfighting Corps . In this coming year alone , ARRC shall routinely engage with five other corps headquarters on the issue of exercising or role , will dock into the operational planning of another , and the force development initiatives of a further two . One senses , however , that as the Alliance progresses towards the objectives of NATO ’ s warfighting capstone concept
( NWCC ) and the principle of Multi-Domain Operations , these types of interactions will need to extend routinely beyond the confines of land forces and out into the other domains of sea , air , space and cyber as well as the special operations component and the information environment .
Readiness as a mindset However , in our estimation , ‘ readiness ’ is ultimately an issue of mindset . There is a fable that the Legate of a Roman Legion asked his soldiers to slap their breast plates during inspections so that the accompanying sound would betray those who had failed to polish both sides of their equipment – a dull thud not in the interests of the Legionary ! Readiness is a bit like that fable . It is not purely about the outward facing aspects of one ’ s business . In fact , it is the inward facing aspects that matter most . We cannot guarantee the geography into which we might deploy – although we might make some assumptions . We cannot guarantee the true nature of the task – although we might make some assumptions . Therefore , we need our people to be comfortable with both the rigour of preparation as well as to possess the mentality to adapt , improvise and overcome . In the words of the first Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe , “ The plan is nothing , planning is everything .” We must therefore embrace the opportunity that change itself presents . COVID , therefore , for all its ills , has tested our ability to adapt and improvise . Through necessity and the expedience of health protection measures , it has naturally affected our access to training . We have not allowed it to be an excuse to do nothing . In fact , it has been an opportunity to find new ways of working , new efficiencies and alternative approaches that may endure long after the pandemic . It also shines a light on what we miss , what is worth keeping and what we must return to .
As we look ahead , we must address the issue of variety in our training . By that token it is the sustenance of a good staff officer . Variety is the spice of life . It enriches our ability to adapt . Warfighting is a perishable skill – honed through exercise and on operations . Our agility to wield it as both a tool of deterrence and as a function of defence will demand that we look across the full breadth of the Land environment ( as it pertains to the SACEUR Area of Responsibility ) and across the dimension of time , bringing landpower to bare across spectrum of deterrence and into defence . LC
These are exciting times for the land domain . Addressing the tactical complexity of contemporary warfare is also an invitation , if not an opportunity , to adapt .
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