LANDPOWER MAGAZINE SPRING 2018 | Page 12

Exercising MJO +:

LEGAL ASPECTS OF TARGETING

By CPT Claire Caniaux ( FRA ), LANDCOM
In November , LANDCOM was certified as combat ready during NATO ’ s largest exercise in 2017 . One of the core functions to be evaluated and conducted was fires , among which the targeting functions were heavily exercised . The exercise was unique due to the fact that LANDCOM ’ s ability to serve as the land component command during an MJO + in a NATO Article 5 environment was tested . This was the first exercise of its kind to test such an environment .
Legal advisors ( LEGADs ) play a key role in the targeting process by reviewing the targeting products to ensure compliance with legal principles . During this exercise , the LEGAD team from LANDCOM deployed to Norway to serve as the core element of a legal office reinforced by four LEGADs drawn from other NATO or national positions .
Targeting activities can have heavy legal implications . Activities intended to have an influence on a particular target may , for example , impact third parties not involved in the crisis . In this regard , the role of the LEGAD is essential . He or she has to be fully involved in the whole targeting process . This article will address the main legal challenges during this process . Additionally , it will catalog the main lessons learned from the exercise viewed from a LEGAD perspective .
Firstly , officers in an MJO + or other high intensity conflict should bear in mind that targeting should not be conducted as it has been conducted during recent operations , such as Iraq or Afghanistan , that is to say in counter-insurgency environments . A counterinsurgency ( COIN ) fight can be defined as “ comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes ” . Indeed , today ’ s officers have been spending most of their careers dealing with COIN environments . As a result , specific efforts were needed in order to adapt their mindset to this different framework in an MJO +.
Of course , in an MJO + level operation , the decisions for engaging a target ( delegation authorities ) can and should be taken at a lower level than in classic COIN environments where the general context is different . Whereas COIN situations are usually being found in Non-international Armed Conflicts ( NIAC ), an MJO + would most probably happen in an International Armed Conflict ( IAC ) context . This allows many aspects to be handled differently , such as the threshold of acceptable collateral damage , border crossing authorities , POW / detention operations , and engaging dual-use targets especially with regards to Lines of Communication ( LOCs ) in order to stop the enemy ’ s advance . These domains generally have more restrictions when armies operate in COIN than when they operate to counter the kinetic invasion of a country by a nearpeer adversary .
The planner should focus on the clear distinction and difference between two concepts : Targeting and CE . It is important for those planners to exercise unfettered warfighting planning and mindsets . Indeed , targeting activities require numerous additional steps than combat engagement does ( for example , CE does
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