Hacking for the Caliphate
On 3 Nov , Afaq released “ A Computer Security Course - For Securing Windows , Mac , and Linux Systems ” over Twitter , which included material from the 11 Jun archive . An 8 Nov release provided “ The Electronic Security Guide for Smartphones ,” which lists a number of applications for improving device security and limiting the permissions granted to other applications , which was also an excerpt from the 11 Jun distribution . Additionally , the guide provides general electronic security tips including how to construct effective long passwords , advice on using alternative search engines , and recommended applications for secure communications .
UCC threatens MEMRI Cyber and Jihad Lab
The pro-DAESH group hackers “ United Cyber Caliphate ” on Telegram have sought contact with MEMRI ' s Cyber and
Jihad Lab and issued a threat after its request was apparently ignored . The Telegram channel United Cyber Caliphate ( private , UCC , 874 members ) on 25 January called on MEMRI ' s Cyber and Jihad Lab ( CJL ) to send them a message , presumably privately , in order to communicate about " exclusive things " the channel might offer up to them . It did not provide any timeframe for the requested communication to take place . Later on 25 January , UCC posted to say that MEMRI CJL had missed an opportunity and was being given a last chance . It mentioned “ Osed Agha " in the post , which appeared to be a reference to UCC ’ s “ leader " whom it identified in December 2016 as " Ased Agha ". On 14 December UCC had advertised an imminent first audio statement which was released later in December and attributed to Ased Agha . The statement announced UCC ' s merger with another pro-IS group , " Cyber Kahilafah ", and threatened that the merger would yield further " hacks and kill lists ". On 26 January UCC advertised a forthcoming second audio statement , which could be delivered by Agha and might involve reference to MEMRI . MEMRI on 25 January published a brief report saying that UCC was recruiting members .
Conclusion
By the information gathered from OS so far , the current capabilities of the DAESH Cyber wing remain very poor , and ineficcient to be able to carry out major cyber attacks . It seems unlikely that pro- DAESH cyber personnel have mastered state of the art technics for producing tailored hacking software to success in their purposes . The hacking software they used so far is normally available in the dark web . Therefore , well known software by LEAs ( Law Enforcement Agencies ), State Institutions and Firms , that cyber counter measures to fight them have already been set as well . Not one hack attack has been claimed by the Cyber Caliphate , which have caused major havoc so far , and its success is reduced to skilled social media manipulation intended for recruiting purposes and spreading ideology . An eventual major threat could happen if any high level Cyber mercenaries , who do not necessarily need to be in communion with the Terrorist Group ’ s ideas , might start working for the UCC , maybe in exchange of money .
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