Building a Strategy for Alliance Land-Power
NATO-led land forces are ready and responsive , interoperable , and successful in full spectrum operations at all levels , capable to deter , and when directed , defeat an adversary 8 .
The term “ NATO-led ’ in this statement is intended to include partners , especially as non-member contributing nations to Alliance operations , activities , and exercises . The objective and corresponding concepts must address land-power in all three core tasks of the Alliance .
In collective defence , land-power is most often the decisive arm in the sense that decision is ultimately made on the ground , where people dwell . In deterrence , land-power works as a key part of the larger joint force within the military instrument of power , representing the most strategically meaningful commitment in terms of human capital . In defence , land-power , in concert with the other components , protects Alliance territory and populations and , when necessary , contains threats emanating from outside Alliance territory .
Land-power is decisive in crisis response . Ready and responsive land forces move rapidly either within Alliance territory to defend and protect , or abroad to contain and mitigate conflict . The goals of land-power in crisis management are to prevent instability from degenerating into larger conflict , to stop ongoing conflicts ; and to stabilize post-conflict situations . When requested , land forces also have a unique capability to support humanitarian assistance and disaster response in the most difficult circumstances .
While cooperative security is primarily a political activity in many respects , Alliance land forces project stability through partnerships 9 . NATO does this in the land domain through formal frameworks and informal relationships with non-NATO land forces . Land forces engage in a range of activities , including training , exercises , security forces assistance , and enabling partner land forces . Building relationships with partners helps to prevent crisis , mitigate conflict , and improve interoperability before a need for combined operations arises . Stronger partners are able to solve their own problems and , in many cases , can contribute to NATO operations . Land forces also help prepare partner security forces on a path to NATO membership .
Alliance land-power is executing the Alliance ’ s strategy even as LAND- COM undertakes the effort to articulate it . With the deployment of Battle Groups as part of enhanced Forward Presence in Estonia , Latvia , Lithuania , and Poland , Alliance land-forces are on the cutting edge of deterrence , demonstrating capability and resolve to defend the Alliance from aggression . Meanwhile , the Alliance considers how to re-orient and “ re-tool ” for a renewed emphasis on conventional , irregular , and hybrid challenges from the east as well as the south . The enhanced NATO Response Force provides robust and responsive land-power and C2 capable to deploy to any environment and meet any challenge on short notice . Land forces will be a key component to implementation of the framework for NATO-Strategic Direction South , enhancing the Alliance ’ s ability to understand and coordinate military cooperation and other activities with partners on the Alliance ’ s southern periphery . In all three core tasks , Alliance land-power carries the weight of Alliance commitment , resolve , and strength . The Corps GRF ( L ) HQs , member land forces , and partners , and Allied Land Command represent the decisive arm of the Alliance , united in peace and ready to prevail in conflict .
1
PO ( 2010 ) 0169 , The Alliance ’ s Strategic Concept , dated 19 November 2010
2
SACEUR ’ s Strategic Challenges : “ Russia , Radicals , and Refugees .”
3
Ends , Ways , Means and Risk as described in the U . S . Army War College strategy formulation model : Arthur F . Lykke Jr ., “ Toward an Understaning of Military Strategy ,” in U . S . Army War College Guide to Strategy , Eds . Joseph R . Cerami and James F . Holcomb , Jr ., Strategic Studies Institute , U . S . Army War College , Carlisle Barracks , PA , February 2001 ; pp . 179-185
4
Adapted from Colin S . Gray , The Strategy Bridge : Theory for Practice , Oxford University Press , 2010 , Oxford . p . 18
5
AAP-6 , Ed . 2015 . P . 2-M-6
6
AJP-3.2 , Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations , Ed . A . Ver . 1 , March 2016 , p . LEX-9
7
The Alliance ’ s Strategic Concept , PO ( 2010 ) 0169 , dated 19 November 2010 , p . 1-2
8
Note that this draft objective statement considered in the Strategy for Alliance Land Power may change as the development progresses , possibly even before publication of this article .
9
Cooperative Security also includes arms control and non-proliferation . While land-power could potentially be used as a last resort in crisis response , these activities are better done in the diplomatic realm .
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