Nato Strategic Direction - South its focus simultaneously to the South and streamline the Alliance ’ s own capabilities and priorities in dealing with different strands of activities . Join efforts with other international organizations , the European Union in particular .
Policy
It is without a doubt that NATO ’ s Southern flank poses a set of unique challenges for the Alliance , as the region is exposed to complex and diverse threats from a combination of state and non-state actors . The Alliance has to develop responses to a wide array of threat scenarios . Including among the other cyber and hybrid warfare , disinformation , human and weapon trafficking , terrorism , asymmetric threats , and illegal migration . These threats have implications on NATO and EU as well .
As a result , it is impossible to create all-encompassing deterrence framework that the Alliance can use to develop the right policy response . The policy approach needs to reflect the heterogeneity of the threat landscape encompassing preemption and prevention . Looking at the readiness of NATO to counter these new elements , a quite well-diversified NATO strategy has already been developed over time , starting with a strategic concept and it ’ s follow-up .
So the discussion should not be really about whether we need a new strategy but how do we use the existing framework to build the necessary responses posed by NSD-S . Essentially , there are two problems that require solutions .
First , it is necessary to solve the perennial problem of budget cuts , burden sharing and defense expenditures , on which regard it is needed to define if resources have to be dedicated to answer the threats coming from Southern Flank , or coming from Eastern Flank , or both .
Second , we need a unified decision that goes even beyond and refers to the role of NATO in trying to create stability across its borders , operating as an enabler .
Conclussions
NATO ’ s Southern flank poses a set of unique challenges . The alliance has to develop responses to a wide array of scenarios generated by civil wars and state failure , a proliferation of non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction ( WMD ) at the hands of armed non state groups , anti-access and area-denial ( A2 / AD ) threats in Syria , the export of terrorism , etc .
Policies listed under preemption essentially aim to constrain or eliminate a threat that is already tangible or palpable . An example would be an attack on civilians by suicide bombers linked to the self-proclaimed Islamic State . Prevention concerns policy options that are more forward-looking and aim to eliminate potential more distant threats — for instance , efforts to strengthen state institutions in post conflict societies to accelerate a return to normality and good enough governance .
Policy responses should not be understood as exclusive , stand-alone strategies designed to fully counter the threats . More often than not , proposals will be only an important yet insufficient component of the overall response . In practice , a more realistic and effective strategy would need to combine policy elements across all domains . So , even if improving the effectiveness of the NATO Response Force is listed as a recommended policy response to hybrid warfare , a more realistic strategy to counter such a threat would involve drawing on tools such as capacity building in partner nations and improved intelligence sharing .
Without prejudice to the Alliance ’ s collective defense commitments , NATO contributions have to be part of a broader multidimensional international community set of responses . This requires effective coordination and cooperation , as appropriate , among all relevant actors involved in the region , inter alia with the EU .
A comprehensive approach across all aspects of diplomatic , informational , military and economic leverages is needed . Beyond the obligations of Article 5 , above and beyond the RAP , NATO requires a single comprehensive strategy for all flanks to interact appropriately , with other relevant Regional and International Organizations ( IO ), such as the UN , EU , AU , Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council . In other words , a clear and cognitive operational design with a defined and attainable end state and objectives must be a prerequisite .
Suggestions - Considerations
NATO as military organization has to invest resources ( money and personnel ) in the following domains :
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It is essential to draft a strategy against unconventional and hybrid threats , enabling NATO to deal comprehensively with such challenges and to prevent them from being “ stealth threats ” against NATO , particularly at the Southern Flanks , which currently NATO is most vulnerable .
Ultimately we can wonder ; Is NATO able to deal with ambiguous threats of the South region using the traditional instruments of the collective defense ?
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