MAGAZINE
FALL 2021 levels of interaction , training and exercises . Taken in total , Alliance initiatives have seen increases to individual member and partner nations ’ security and , by extension , Alliance security has collectivley benefited .
Notwithstanding NATO actions , post-2014 events such as the November 2018 Russian seizure of Ukranian ships in the Sea of Asov , or the more recent aggresive actions toward HMS Defender off the coast of Crimea in June of 2021 , have shown Black Sea regional security remains turbulent , and NATO is being urged to do more . However , any expectation that NATO can create or impose overarching security in the Black Sea Region may be misplaced . In fact , the Alliance is challenged even in extending security subsets , including military security , within the region for a number of key reasons .
Primarily , as an alliance , NATO is not monolithic and its reliance upon consensus means that any member nation , regional or otherwise , can directly influence actions . In other words , it can not regionally act like a state and is ill advised to do so , be it through principles of dominance or reciprocity , for fear of fracturing the Alliance . No matter the perception of the region ’ s importance , or its perceived lack of security , there is very little likelihood that , for example , nations reliant upon Russian commodities will support Alliance actions that may jeopardize access .
Additionally , assuming consensus can be achieved , the practical implementation of any NATO initiative is down to member nations and , thus , envisioned effects supporting Black Sea security are often met with friction of practical implementation . It is for such reasons that the aforementioned Multinational Brigade South-East , having only modest participation from other nations , remains largely a Romanian brigade under NATO flag . The cost of NATO ’ s enhanced C2 in the South-East of its area of responsibility is being footed , for the most part , by a single nation ( Romania ), and no NATO permanent Black Sea maritime force has materialized despite prolonged discussion and its obvious merit .
Finally , NATO is challenged by its ability to directly effect the non-military ( even if militarized ) tools that Russia ’ s hybrid approach utilizes . While Alliance expertise exists , it is largely confined to advisory roles and delivered upon request . Moreover , in line with NATO ’ s raison d ’ etre , its approach to counterhybrid is defensive in nature and , therefore , reactive . Perhaps most importantly , in the application of effects , both the Alliance and its constituent members are confined both by the rule of law and international norms ; neither of which are viewed as constraints by Russia .
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