MAGAZINE
FALL 2021
Under the power of Vladimir Putin and with the stabilization of its economy , Russian expansionism in the Black Sea Region was renewed . In 2008 , having perhaps learned from the international community ’ s lack of response to the 1991 separation , and subsequent occupation by Russia of the Moldovan territory of Transnistria , and on the heels of NATO ’ s pronouncement of its intent to accept Georgia into the Alliance , Russia invaded and occupied the Georgian provinces of Abkhasia and South Osetia . In a similar vein , in 2014 following the ouster of President Yanukovich for his rejection of greater European economic ties and subsequent suppression of popular dissent ( and again without meaningful international reaction ), Russia invaded and annexed Crimea and fomented the succession of the Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk and Lugansk . These combined actions served to substantially increase Russia ’ s control over portions of the region both on land and sea , thereby increasing its level of security , be it real or perceived . Clearly , this has created a direct loss of security in all respects to NATO partners Georgia and Ukraine , and an indirect loss to NATO member states within the region .
marketing throughout the region with the dual purpose of bolstering the Russian economy while creating a market dependency that can be leveraged in a number of ways . Beyond this , there is no reason to believe that Russia ’ s playbook of malign activities in the region such as cyber attacks , psychological and information warfare , and use of proxies will be closed . It can be hypothesized that Russia ’ s desire for regional dominance has not abated , only its methods of achieving regional ‘ unipolarity ’ have changed .
NATO ’ S RESPONSE NATO ’ s intent to meaningfully counter Russian expansionism and thereby increase Black Sea security was initiated at the 2014 Wales Summit , built upon in successive summits , and has seen an uptick in both quantity and quality of NATO capabilities generally , and in the Black Sea Region specifically . Collectively known as the Readiness Action Plan ( RAP ), distinct activities were , and continue to be , characterized as either Assurance Measures ( the presence of Alliance military capabilities aimed at both assuring NATO members and their populations , and deterring threat ), or Adaptation Measures ( changes to Alliance structure and capabilities aimed at increasing responsiveness and effectiveness ).
Assurance Measures are tailored to the region and / or allied nation at hand , and are intended to provide a meaningful effect through presence , increased capability and / or coverage of a gap
Specific to future Russian intent , there is a clear , overarching goal of solidifying gains at least in their present state ; practically translating to the physical retention of Crimea in perpetuity , and the maintenance of direct influence over the ‘ autonomous regions ’ of Abkhasia , South Osetia , Donetsk and Lugansk . In other words , international acceptance of the status quo . However , it is possible that the status quo is insufficient to Russia ’ s perceived security and political needs or desires . Militarily , while wholesale breaches of sovereignty present significant risk , it is conceivable that Russia could continue its offensive in Ukraine with a view to create land access to Crimea and alleviating the choke point formed by the Kerch Strait . Such an action would give Russia complete ownership of the Sea of Azov , thereby affording greater security to this sea , the Caspian Sea , and the strategically important ( but vulnerable ) Volga-Don Canal which connects the two . Politically and economically , it is assured that Russia will continue to expand its fossil fuel
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