MAGAZINE
FALL 2020
“ History doesn ’ t repeat itself
, but it does rhyme
”
Mark Twain ( supposedly )
Strategic Concept sought to provide for the security of the “ North Atlantic Treaty area primarily by a credible deterrence , effected by confronting any possible threatened or actual aggression , ranging from covert operations to all-out nuclear war , with adequate NATO forces .”¹ While in the two decades immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall NATO largely focused the core tasks of cooperative security and crisis response , the Alliance ’ s 2010 Strategic Concept reinvigorated the Alliance ’ s third , and primary , core task of collective defence as its greatest responsibility . Central to that collective defence is an emphasis on “ deterrence , based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities ” as the core of NATO ’ s strategy ². In 1967 , as MC 14 / 3 was adopted , the Soviets were seen as keen to exploit their adversaries for own advantage and thereby strengthen their own position as a world power . This included attempts at fracturing the unity of the alliance through a mix of military , political , economic , and ideological efforts . In echoes of how Russia operates today , Soviet policy at that time was based on five key pillars : economic means , political means , propaganda , subversion ( including the spread of communist ideology and export of arms and materiel ), and military power ³. To counter this threat , MC 14 / 3 focused on flexible and credible options for escalation against a Soviet-initiated attack . In the Military Committee ’ s words , “ the deterrent concept of the Alliances is based on a flexibility that will prevent the potential aggressor from predicting with confidence NATO ’ s specific response to
( 1 ) North Atlantic Military Committee , MC 14 / 3 : Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area , ( 12 December 1967 ).
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( 2 ) NATO : Strategic Concepts , webpage , updated 1 June 2018 . ( 3 ) MC 14 / 3 : Enclosure 1 , page 4