non inversely proportional to the path followed by the “ All Arms ” formation history . It is the hypertrophy of the commanding systems . In order to discover it , two interesting parallels can be drawn . The first one would be – in times of peace – between the staff of a French army corps in 1913 , that is approximately 20 people , and that of a NATO army corps , like the one currently stationed in Lille , approximately 450 men in quarters and up to 700 in operations . However , on one hand this example might not seem relevant enough , because it compares two different things . On the other hand , the second one would be between the structures of the French staff of General Salan in 1953 in Indochina , and that of General Petraeus in 2011 in Afghanistan . The two conflicts in question are temporally apart but their theatre level is the same . The conclusions of these two comparisons show that the ratio between the number of officers in the staff and the number of officers belonging to a unit in mission was reversed . The result of which is that there are fewer young officers to command the execution of the tactical action , but many , older “ top brass ” to conceptualise and then control this very action . Such a difference leads to a syndrome of macrocephaly of the tactical command , which falls in the search for a balance between centralisation and devolution . Here lays the necessity for LANDCOM advocacy - to design new way of command and control in order to fit with starfish-type organisations and working in a network-centric information environment .
This very point for land warfare command and control evolution has been made worse by a heavy , somehow redundant and unchanged organizational configuration since the outbreak of WWI . In Afghanistan in 2009 , the NATO chain of command from the SHAPE down to the company commander of any task force had eight levels of hierarchy . This was eight levels where each level needed to conduct its own mission analysis in order to understand the situation , go through a new MDMP process , and release orders to be implemented by its subordinate command . By the way , one century ago when Foch was leading the Allied Armies to the path of victory , the chain of command also encompassed 8 hierarchy levels . But at each level they were using a campaign telephone to release their orders . Nowadays orders and reporting their system are monitored with a smart computer with the same heavy chain of command and hierarchy . Command and control adaptation becomes a core issue to ensure NATO military dominance . Whereas any military chain of command relies on a vertical structure how do we introduce horizontal communication in order to lead to a connected world .
Conclusion
To conclude this paper , the proposal is to look at these problems in a somewhat revolutionary manner . Here the word revolutionary isn ’ t being used in its historical sense , but along the lines of how J . F . C Fuller used it . One could finally listen again to our Spiritus rector : “ Armies are conservative organizations ; they adapt themselves slowly to new environments , and especially to new mental surroundings . Today a new epoch of war is dawning , and we are surrounded by a veritable fog of new ideas .” Ten years ago , the new military fashion leading land warfare changes was the Effects-based Operations and the Comprehensive Approach . Today behind the fog of war rises a new approach
to adapting NATO .
Perhaps to avoid NATO being smashed by dogmas inherited from the Cold War ’ s inertia , land warfare adaptation should mirror the edge of complexity . This complexity could be depicted as a multifaceted battlefield . Firstly , land warfare organizational configuration needs to match a complex threat . We all know the aphorism by Wellington : “ All the business of war [ knowing ]… What was at the other side of the hill .” Today NATO faces both threats simultaneously , on one hand a resurgent threat to the East and on the other hand a persistent threat to the south . Secondly , war fighting is becoming gradually more and more complex . The road to war relies on a multitude of elements that need to be prepared , trained and equipped- Arms and Single services from 29 countries- with the same unique political goal . Throughout the conduct of war , such diversity needs to be merged towards the integration of military power as the most concrete expression of the legitimate use of force through NATO Joint fires . To face this existential challenge , the Alliance needs to keep in mind that the very essence of war is above all its telluric and human dimensions . For centuries wars have started and ended on land . Thus , the challenging complexity of the multifaceted battlefield leads to a Land Command issue within NATO .
16LAND POWER